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An Incurable Malaise: Commonwealth v. Australian
Capital Territory and Baskin v. Bogan as Symptoms of
Early-Onset Dystopia
Neville Rochow SC ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Dystopia holds sway in all of our imaginations. That concept of
control by others and loss of individual freedom is the stuff of our
collective nightmare. The very idea that the only freedom is one of
conforming to an order that is dictated sends chills down the spine.
One thing that is noticeably absent in the books and films of the
popular dystopia is any mention of deity or religion. The implied
premise seems to be that all such questions were disposed of long
before the events of the current story. But nowhere do we get the
backstory as to how such questions disappeared.
We are left to guess how, in this or that particular dystopia,
consideration of the divine disappeared. Recognizing, as one must,
that correlation is not causation, we are left to speculate whether the
loss of religious inclination was merely coincidental or whether that
loss may have had some contributing effect to the sorry state of
affairs in which the story places us.
We may not be in need of speculation much longer. It has long
been a part of the arsenal of arguments used against proposed
changes to marriage laws that these laws would be used as a
weapon—in combination with anti-discrimination laws—to drive
more conservative, predominantly religious views of marriage from

∗ Barrister; adjunct Professor at Notre Dame University, Sydney, and adjunct Associate
Professor at University of Adelaide Law School; member of the Adelaide Law School Research
Unit for the Study of Society, Law and Religion. The views expressed in this paper are those of
the author alone and are not necessarily those of any organization. Earlier versions of this
article were presented on Aug. 26, 2014 at the Marriage Day Conference, Parliament House,
st
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia and on Oct. 6, 2014 at the 21 Annual
International Law and Religion Symposium, “Varieties of Secularism, Religion and the Law,”
Provo UT. They also reflect the law as it stood as at January 2015. The decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) and other recent
developments are considered in the Postscript to this Article.
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the public square. With the changes that are occurring, those
arguments—placed as logical extrapolations—now have evidence that
the laws promoting tolerance of deviations from a previously
accepted norm seem only to promote tolerance of the deviation in
substitution of the norm. This limits the freedom of those who hold
conservative views from promoting or even preferring the norm.
In the case of marriage reform, which is so closely connected to
moral and religious beliefs, our only freedom left might be
conformity. If so, could we perhaps be witnessing symptoms of earlyonset dystopia?
This Article looks at how various courts have recently dealt with
questions of proposed marriage reform and finds that they have
limited the ability of gay marriage opponents to disagree. This
limitation puts freedom of conscience and religious liberty at serious
risk. 1 The approach of these courts also suggests that societies can
introduce a new right without carefully considering the cost that it
may have for time-honored liberties that have served society well in
the past. This Article argues that instead of requiring an urgent
rewriting of all that is now held dear to many individuals, societies
should take a gradualist approach, weighing each matter carefully
before jettisoning the old mores. 2
To accomplish all of this, this Article analyzes two cases, one
from Australia and one from the United States: Australian Capital
Territory and Baskin. Part II introduces these two cases and some of
the problems with their reasoning. Parts III and IV then delve into
each of the cases individually, pointing out—particularly in Baskin—
the arguments and factual matters that appear to be the subjects of
confusion, elision, conflation, and oversight. Part V then addresses
evidence of the negative impact same-sex marriage would have on

1. One scholar has argued that the protections for religious freedom in Australia were
already relatively weak. See generally, Denise Meyerson, The Protection of Religious Rights
under Australian Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 529. As to the potential for greater protection, see
Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, Feels Like Déjà vu: An Australian Bill of Rights, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 821, 836–42; Protecting Religious Freedom under Bills of Rights: Australia as Microcosm,
in FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILL OF RIGHTS 1 (Paul Babie & Neville Rochow
eds., 2012).
2. Other issues, beyond the scope of this inquiry, include whether our antidiscrimination laws require recalibration. See Neil J. Foster & Katherine Towers, New Antidiscrimination Laws “Erode Religious Freedom”, THE AUSTRALIAN, May 9, 2014, at 35–6,
available at http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/81.
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society generally and children especially. Part VI shows the history
and tactics of the LGBT community in achieving its goal of same-sex
marriage, including the negative impact it is having on the freedoms
of speech, association, religion, and conscience. Part VII concludes
questioning whether the law is developing in a way that benefits
society as a whole.
II. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY & BASKIN:
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS
A. Australian Capital Territory Introduction
In a previous article, I explained how, under Australian
constitutional arrangements, it was arguable whether the federal or
the state legislatures are competent to pass laws permitting so-called
“same-sex” marriage. 3 The suggested limitation on the federal
legislature depends on an originalist interpretation of the federal
marriage power. 4 While there was no certainty at the time of writing
that article that such an argument would be accepted by the High
Court of Australia, it was defensible based on dicta from earlier
decisions of that Court. 5 It was also sustainable by analogizing to
cases where a similar argument had been accepted by the Court in
respect of other institutions and legal constructs existing when the
Constitution came into force in 1901. 6 As to limits on the State’s
legislative powers to make laws permitting same-sex marriage, the
arguments rested upon a more certain foundation. Under section
109 of the Constitution, federal legislation on a matter within federal
power has “paramountcy” 7 over any concurrent state legislation on
the same matter. 8 Regarding territory legislation, acts establishing

3. See generally Neville Rochow, “Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace”—The
Influence of Constitutional Argument on Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Debates in Australia,
2013 BYU L. REV. 521.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 540.
7. This term is used in Australian constitutional literature to denote the supremacy of
federal legislation over state legislation when the criteria of section 109 of the Constitution
are satisfied.
8. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109 (“When a law of a State is inconsistent with a
law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be invalid.”).
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federal territory legislatures provide for federal paramountcy similar
to section 109. 9
In 2004, federal Parliament passed an amendment to the
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) that, for current purposes, had two
significant effects. First, it introduced what had been assumed since
Federation but not expressly provided: a traditional definition of
marriage—namely, that “marriage” in Australia was between a man
and a woman, entered voluntarily, to the exclusion of all others, for
life. 10 Secondly, it introduced section 88AE, which prohibited the
recognition of so-called “same-sex” marriages solemnized overseas as
marriages in Australia. 11 The changes were remarkable in two
respects: first, because they went contrary to trends in some
jurisdictions towards the legal recognition of marriages without
regard to the gender of the contracting parties; second, because their
passage into law came about through bi-partisan support. 12 Ten years
later and with the benefit of hindsight, supporters of these changes
regard them as revolutionary in the Orwellian sense: despite trends
in other jurisdictions, Australia has held true to the correct principles
that inform what describes a marriage. For opponents of same-sex
marriage, the amendment gave them cause to celebrate: the 2004
amendment had proven prescient as a barrier to trends that they
would not want to see emulated in Australia. But the celebration of
the “revolutionary” marriage amendment serves as a prelude to the
subject matter of the present article in another way.
By the time of the 2014 celebration, the posturing as to either of
the constitutional arguments referred to above had been brought to
an end by the High Court in Commonwealth v Australian Capital
Territory, in which case the Court declared territory same-sex
marriage legislation invalid. 13 In this widely anticipated result, the
Court unanimously held that territory legislation permitting and
9. See, e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) s 28. See
also Anne Twomey, Same-sex marriage – Inconsistency between Commonwealth and Territory
Laws, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY (Nov. 28, 2013), available at http://sydney.edu.au/
law/cru/documents/2013/same_sex_marriage.pdf.
10. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5 (Austl.).
11. Id. at s 88EA.
12. See Marriage Amendment Bill 2004 (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0405/05bd005.
13. See generally Commonwealth v. Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR
441 (Austl.).
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recognizing marriages without regard to gender was invalid because
of its inconsistency with the federal Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). The
celebration of the federal amendment and the striking down of the
territory law was, however, tinged. In fact, the decision had a distinct
sting in the tail for both sides of the marriage debate. Despite the
opponents of the same-sex marriage law not intervening, the Court
considered the originalist argument in their absence and rejected it.
The Court also said that the way was indeed open for potential
federal laws permitting same-sex marriage. 14 Not only did the Court
pronounce via dicta that the federal government could pass marriage
laws without regard to gender, but also it saw no barrier to federal
laws permitting polygamy. 15
This last pronouncement was neither anticipated nor welcomed
by either side of the debate. Proponents of same-sex marriage have
generally been at pains to promote their proposed reforms as but a
very small step that should not concern anyone with regard to its
implications. In order to win support, they generally have been
careful to distance themselves from any suggestion of polygamy. 16
And opponents of same-sex marriage are generally opposed to any
concept of plurality of spouses. Indeed, anything outside of what is
regarded as traditional marriage is anathema to them. Needless to
say, same-sex marriage opponents in Australia have looked upon
other jurisdictions with a combination of bemusement and horror as
they see one after the other falling prey to arguments presented in
either courts or legislatures to re-define marriage so as to permit socalled “marriage equality.” Not only do they deprecate what they see
as the deception in that label, but they now fear that, over time, a
majority of federal legislators may be persuaded to support a change
in the federal marriage law under what they regard as its deceptive
and beguiling influence.
14. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2.
15. Id. at ¶¶ 33–7.
16. See, as an example, the opinion piece by same-sex marriage supporter and campaign
director for Australian Marriage Equality, Rodney Croome, Marriage Equality and the
Christian Persecution Narrative, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (Aug. 15,
2011), http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/08/15/3293123.htm. See also the
reaction to the suggestion of a link between arguments supporting same-sex marriage and
polygamy in the following op-ed article: Staff Writers, Bisexual Advocate Dismisses ACL Link,
STAROBSERVER.COM (June 14, 2012), http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/bisexualadvocate-dismisses-acl-link/79068.
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Perhaps what was not fully appreciated at the tenth anniversary
of Australia’s quiet revolution on marriage law was that there was a
further reason for them to celebrate; as in all things, the decision in
Australian Capital Territory could have been much worse. A
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, Baskin v. Bogan, demonstrates how things might have turned
out in Australia. 17 Baskin is one of the most recent of a number of
the United States decisions that have overturned state constitutional
provisions, to the same effect as the 2004 amendment to the
Australian Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). Just how badly the topic of
genderless marriage could be handled by an unsympathetic court
cannot be appreciated without reading Baskin. Its hectoring tone
shows the deep-seated deprecation that its members held for any
argument in opposition to same-sex marriage. And it is that very
tone that deprives it of any persuasive value to the objective reader.
Both the Australian Capital Territory and Baskin decisions were
handed down within a short time after argument, 18 and both cases
decided a similar issue but under different constitutional regimes.
B. Confusion at Home and Bewilderment From Afar
Both cases also contain elements that are surprising to the
Anglo-Australian lawyer trained in the traditions of common law and
the doctrine of stare decisis. In Australian Capital Territory, the
surprising element is the use of dicta effectively to decide anticipated
cases regarding issues when all proper contradictors on those issues
were not before the Court. This has led to some startling new ways
of viewing both stare decisis and constitutional interpretation in
Australia. Nevertheless, the High Court ultimately left the question
to be decided by democratic processes and through the legislative
arm of government. In Baskin, what is surprising is not only the
intemperate use of language in its reasons, 19 but also the vaults in
logic and fact-finding in the reasoning which are breathtaking for an
17. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub nom. Walker v.
Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
18. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶ 44 (Austl.)
(nine days after argument); Baskin, 766 F.3d (also nine days after argument).
19. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 662 (“Heterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing
unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not
produce unwanted children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go figure.”).
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intermediate appellate court. To compound this, it appears to the
observer from afar that members of the court have vaulted the
separation of legislative power from judicial power and to have
circumvented democratic processes by striking down the results of
the referendum on grounds that appear quite tenuous.
While the Australian Constitution also has a “full faith and
credit” provision, 20 the recent U.S. jurisprudence developments on
same-sex marriage do not provide a coherent approach as to how the
federal constitutional principles invoked in support can operate in
the way these courts have said they do.
First, there seems to be inconsistency among the respective
courts as to how the Fourteenth Amendment applies in such cases.
For example, a decision of another court is decided with the opposite
outcome of Baskin despite being handed down within a day of
Baskin and dealing with similar constitutional and legislative
provisions. 21 Furthermore, it is not at all clear to the outsider why
the “full faith and credit” is not accorded to those state
constitutional provisions that provide for monogamous, heterosexual
marriage. It is not clear why the right of those who vote not to have
same-sex marriage in the state boundaries find those rights treated as
being automatically subservient to the rights of those who come
from states where the vote has been cast the other way. And why
must the according of full faith and credit extend beyond the
individuals involved to overturn the democratic processes of the
entire state?
Second, when the same question in the United States is framed
under different constitutional and rights structures, such as in
Europe and Australia, the highest courts of these areas come to the
opposite conclusion. How does the Fourteenth Amendment operate
differently in the United States so that the U.S. courts come to such
different conclusions from the European Court of Human Rights on
the issue of the State’s right to re-define marriage when both
jurisdictions are purporting to correctly interpret bills of rights? Can
this merely be a question of different words in the rights-conferring

20. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 118 (“Full faith and credit shall be given,
throughout the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial
proceeding of every State.”).
21. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 913 (E.D. La. 2014).
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instruments giving rise to different rights or could it be that there is
some political agenda being played out in the courts? 22
III. VINDICATION OF THE AMENDMENT IN 2004:
COMMONWEALTH V. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
The Australian Capital Territory case resolved the debate on
who could change marriage laws in Australia. As with probably every
revolution, the amendment to the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) was not
universally popular. There persisted, until recently, an argument that
the federal Act still permitted entry by states and territories into the
legislative field of marriage so that each local legislature could, if it so
chose, pass an Act permitting gender-neutral marriage in its own
state or territory and recognize such marriages if contracted
elsewhere. 23 Though apparently difficult for some gender-neutral
proponents to accept, 24 the position taken in the Parliament in 2004
was vindicated by the High Court in Australian Capital Territory.
The amendment had the desired effect. There would be no same-sex
marriage in Australia while its provisions remain in force.
A. Background to Commonwealth v. Australian Capital Territory
A previous article describes the polemics and history of same-sex
marriage in Australia. 25 In short, each of the Australian States that
proposed legislation permitting so-called same-sex marriage in their
jurisdiction were persuaded not to pass such a law. 26
One policy reason for Australia not to follow other jurisdictions
in permitting same-sex marriage may be that since the 1970s and
progressively up to 2008, there has been a process of removal of
distinctions in laws regulating unmarried domestic partnerships that

22. See generally Hämäläinen v. Finland, App. No. 37359/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014).
23. Rochow, supra note 1.
24. At the time of writing there have been reports of another bill being prepared for
presentation in the Norfolk Island legislature. Norfolk Island Gay Marriage Bid ‘Safe’,
NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 17, 2014, 7:06 AM), http://www.news.com.au/national/breakingnews/norfolk-island-considers-gay-marriage/story-e6frfku9-1227061263356. Indications are
that this bill would be defeated through the political process.
25. Rochow, supra note 1.
26. Id. at 529.
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are heterosexual or homosexual. 27 In fact, state laws even accord
rights in property in financial awards to multiple party
relationships. 28 Where there were remaining areas of discrimination,
they were dealt with in 2008 by a suite of federal legislation to
remove all differences other than the case of marriage and, in most
states, adoption. 29
As mentioned, foremost among the legal arguments that were
accepted by those States was that any such legislation would be
invalid pursuant to section 109 of the Australian Constitution. 30 That
section operates to invalidate any state legislation that is inconsistent
with federal legislation on the same subject matter. 31 It was accepted
by the state legislatures that sought submissions that any venture
into the legislative field of “marriage” would be inconsistent with the
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) because that Act had shown an intention
to operate as a complete code on the subject. That included, as a

27. There has been a long succession of legislation at both state and federal level over
some decades seeking to equate, as far as possible, both married and unmarried relationships,
without regard to their heterosexual or homosexual nature. They have had the cumulative
effect of providing the same economic and proprietary outcomes, irrespective of the status of
the relationship, in areas of taxation, superannuation and property settlements. See Same-Sex
Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-General Law Reform) Act 2008
(Austl.); Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-Superannuation)
Act 2008 (Austl.); Property Law (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vic) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships
Act 1996 (SA) (Austl.); Local Government Act 1995 (WA) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships
Act 1991 (NT) (Austl.); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (Austl.); Property (Relationships)
Act 1984 (NSW) (Austl.); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) (Austl.); Maintenance Act 1967 (Tas)
(Austl.); Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) (Austl.).
28. See supra note 27; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 90SM (Austl.). As an example, the
definition of “de facto relationship” in section 3 of the De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA)
(Austl.) contemplates more than one person satisfying the criteria with any particular partner.
There is thus no restriction to monogamous relationships in the Act. Id.
29. See Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-General Law
Reform) Act 2008 (Austl.); Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth LawsSuperannuation) Act 2008 (Austl.); Property Law (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vict.) (Austl.); De
Facto Relationships Act 1996 (S. Austl.); Local Government Act 1995 (W. Austl.); De Facto
Relationships Act 1991 (N. Terr.) (Austl.); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (Austl.); Property
(Relationships)
Act 1984
(N.S.W.)
(Austl.); Succession
Act 1981
(Queensl.)
(Austl.); Maintenance Act 1967 (Tas.) (Austl.); Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898
(N.S.W.) (Austl.).
30. See Twomey, supra note 9; AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109.
31. Id. (“When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the
latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.”);
Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 48–61 (Austl.).
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consequence of the 2004 amendment, the definition of marriage. 32
Any entry into that legislative field by a state would be invalid. All of
the states showed a reluctance to run the risk of their laws being
challenged and invalidated by the High Court.
The only exception to this reluctance was the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT). That territory has a seventeen-member unicameral
Legislative Assembly and enjoys self-government subject to certain
constraints imposed legislatively and constitutionally. Among the
constraints is section 28 of the Australian Capital Territory (SelfGovernment) Act 1988. 33 For all practical purposes, section 28 has a
similar effect for territory legislation as section 109 has for
state legislation.
Prior to the 2012 territory election, the Labor Government of
the Australian Capital Territory had governed as a minority party
with support of the Greens. 34 The Greens have long had a policy of
so-called “marriage equality.” Apparently as part of the price for
continued support from the Greens, the ACT Labor government
went to the polls in 2012 with a policy that it would legislate for
same-sex marriage in the territory if re-elected. It was returned by
the narrowest of margins, 35 needing support from the Greens in
order to govern. On September 19, 2013, the ACT AttorneyGeneral introduced the Marriage Equality (Same-Sex) Act Bill 2013
into the chamber. 36 With support of the Greens, the legislation was
32. See Olivia Rundle, An examination of relationship registration schemes in Australia,
25 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 121, 126–7 (2011). Marriage Amendment Act 2004 ch 1 s 5(1) (Austl.)
(“Marriage means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily
entered into for life.”).
33. Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth).
34. The Greens are an Australian Political Party, ostensibly formed to protect the
environment from legislation and governmental policies that would otherwise be to what the
party’s members consider its detriment. The policies of the party range much more widely and
generally take the extreme liberal position on moral and social issues such as abortion,
euthanasia and same-sex marriage. See generally THE GREENS, http://greens.org.au/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2015).
35. That is with only 41 more votes on the popular vote and with an equal number of
seats to the Liberal opposition under the Hare-Clarke electoral system which operates in the
Australian Capital Territory. See ELECTIONS ACT, 2012 RESULTS BY ELECTORATE AND BY
PARTY (2012), http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/past_act_legislative_
assembly_elections/2012_act_legislative_assembly_election/2012_election_results2/2012_res
ults_by_electorate_and_by_party.
36. Santilla Chingaipe, ACT to Push Ahead with Gay Marriage Laws, SBS WORLD
NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/10/22/act-push-ahead-
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passed into law on October 22, 2013. 37 It was to come into
operation on November 7, 2013 and the first marriages would be
permitted on December 7, 2013. 38
There was strong opposition to the bill not only from the Liberal
Party opposition, but also within the community. 39 One of the
reasons for opposition among sections of the community included
the social policy arguments mounted and championed by religious
groups. Religious leaders from several different faith traditions
signed a joint letter sent by the Australian Christian Lobby to
Attorney General Corbell protesting the bill and its anticipated social
and legal consequences. 40
The managing director of the Australian Christian Lobby, Lyle
Shelton, raised a specific concern with the Attorney General
regarding people of faith not being able, in conscience, to support
same-sex marriages in the supply of goods or services. 41 The response

gay-marriage-laws; Cec Busby, Same-Sex Marriage Bill Passes in ACT, GAY NEWS NETWORK
(Oct. 22 2013), http://gaynewsnetwork.com.au/news/national/same-sex-marriage-billpasses-in-act-12193.html; Marriage Equality (Same-Sex) Act Bill 2013 (Cth) (Austl.).
37. See supra note 36.
38. See supra note 36; Katherine Murphy, High court to hear challenge to ACT same sex
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
4,
2013),
marriage
laws
in
December,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/nov/04/high-court-to-hear-challenge-to-actsame-sex-marriage-laws-in-december.
39. Lisa Cox & Peter Jean, Rush to Save Gay Marriage Bill, CANBERRATIMES.COM.AU
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/rush-to-save-gay-marriagebill-20131021-2vxek.html; Elizabeth Byrne, High Court throws out ACT’s same-sex marriage
laws, ABC NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-12/high-courtdecision-on-act-same-sex-marriage-laws/5152168.
40. See Cox & Jean, supra note 39. The following leaders specifically spoke out against
the Bill: Rabbi Shimon Cowen; Bishop Trevor Edwards, vicar general of the Anglican Diocese
of Canberra and Goulburn; Monsignor John Woods, administrator of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Canberra and Goulburn; Pastor Sean Stanton, of Australian Christian
Churches; Rabbi Shmuel Feldman; Pastor B.J. Hayes, of the Canberra National Adventist
Church; Imam Adama Konda, of the Canberra Islamic Centre; and Arnold Cummins, stake
president in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. They were joined by Lyle Shelton,
managing director of the Australian Christian Lobby. Id.
41. For a case note by the author about a recent example of this, see Same-sex Marriage
and Property Rights Compete in New York State, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME AUSTRALIA,
available at http://www.nd.edu.au/sydney/schools/law/on-the-case/on-the-case-issue-7.
Otherwise, see the excellent commentary on this type of issue in my colleague Associate
Professor Foster’s paper. Neil J. Foster, Discrimination, Language and Freedom of Religion:
Two Important Law and Religion decisions in Australia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW
AND RELIGION STUDIES, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY “VARIETIES OF SECULARISM,
RELIGION AND LAW” OCT. 5–7, 2014. Neil J. Foster, Sesame Street and the Gay Cake, LAW
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from the Attorney-General confirmed the worst fears of Mr. Shelton
and the religious leaders:
[A]ny right to express contrary opinions is balanced under sections
7 and 20 of the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). It would be
unlawful for those who provide goods, services and facilities in the
wedding industry to discriminate against another person on the
basis of their sexuality or their relationship status. This includes
discrimination by refusing to provide or make available those
goods, services or facilities. Australians are free to express contrary
views as the church leaders and the Australian Christian Lobby has
[sic] done, provided they do so within the law. 42

Given the resolution of the ACT government to proceed with
the bill, members of the Australian community, both within and
outside of the ACT, asked for the recently elected federal Liberal
government to challenge the Act, in the High Court, once it became
law. 43 A case was reserved under section 18 of the Judiciary Act 1903
(Cth). Argument was heard on December 3, 2013. The Full Bench 44
heard the case and delivered their reasons on December 12, 2013. 45
Prior to the hearing, religious leaders and faith-based groups,
including the Australian Christian Lobby and the Australian Family
Association, gave consideration to seeking leave to intervene. 46

AND RELIGION AUSTRALIA (May 23, 2015), https://lawandreligionaustralia.wordpress.com/
category/sexual-orientation-discrimination/; See also Jordan Pendergrass, Symposium 2014:
Australia, BYU LAW INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES,
http://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=2&linkId=246&contentId=2126&blurbId=35404.
42. Letter from Simon Corbell, Attorney-General, Australian Capital Territory, to Lyle
Shelton, Managing Director, Australian Christian Lobby (Nov. 21, 2013) (on file
with author).
43. Interview by the author with Ms. Giulia Jones, MLC Australian Capital Territory
Legislative Assembly (Nov. 2015); Interview by the author with Mr. Lyle Shelton, Australian
Christian Lobby (Nov. 2015); Interview by the author with Elder Jeffrey Cummings, The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Nov. 2015).
44. Generally a full bench consists of seven justices, but because newly appointed
Justice Gageler had, prior to appointment, recently advised the ACT government that it could
not validly pass legislation of the kind, his Honor recused himself, leaving a bench of six. See
Transcript of Hearing, Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441
(Austl.), available at http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/other/HCATrans/2013/299.html
[hearinafter Commonwealth v ACT Hearing Transcript]; see also Twomey, supra note 9, at 13;
Infra note 56.
45. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441 (Austl.).
46. Interview by the author with Lyle Shelton of the Australian Christian Lobby and
Terri Kelleher of the Australian Family Association (Nov. 2015).
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However, they were dissuaded from doing so by the federal
government on the basis that doing so may work as a distraction
from the central arguments the government wished to present. 47 In
the case, the only intervention sought and granted was by Marriage
Equality Australia, a homosexual rights activist group, which
presented arguments in support of the ACT legislation.
B. The Decision in Commonwealth v. ACT
A unanimous Court handed down its judgment and reasoning,
holding that the Act was invalid. 48 The Court held that the whole of
the Act had to be struck down because it was inconsistent with the
Marriage Act within the meaning of section 28 of the Australian
Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 and, as a consequence,
had no effect. 49 The Court held that the Marriage Act, as amended
in 2004, provided a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the
law in respect of marriage in Australia. 50 No territorial legislation
could accord any relationship the status of marriage inconsistent with
the Act. 51 If this were to be considered a victory by those who

47. Id.
48. Commonwealth, 88 HCA at 21.
49. Id. at 19–20.
50. Id.; see also Twomey, supra note 9.
51. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 57–9
(Austl.) (“The Marriage Act regulates the creation and recognition of the legal status of
marriage throughout Australia. The Act's definition of marriage sets the bounds of that legal
status within the topic of juristic classification with which the Act deals. Read as a whole, the
Marriage Act, at least in the form in which it now stands, makes the provisions which it does
about marriage as a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the law with respect to the
creation and recognition of the legal status of marriage. Why otherwise was the Marriage Act
amended, as it was in 2004, by introducing a definition of marriage in the form which now
appears, except for the purpose of demonstrating that the federal law on marriage was to be
complete and exhaustive? The 2004 amendments to the Marriage Act made plain (if it was not
already plain) that the federal marriage law is a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the
law of marriage (emphasis added). Those amendments applied the newly introduced definition
of marriage to the provisions governing solemnisation of marriage and gave effect to that
definition in the provisions governing the recognition of marriages solemnised outside
Australia. Section 88EA of the Marriage Act (inserted by the 2004 amendments) provides
expressly that a union solemnised in a foreign country between persons of the same sex must
not be recognised as a marriage in Australia. These particular provisions of the Marriage Act,
read in the context of the whole Act, necessarily contain the implicit negative proposition that
the kind of marriage provided for by the Act is the only kind of marriage that may be formed
or recognised in Australia.”); See also Olivia Rundle, An Examination of Relationship
Registration Schemes in Australia, 25 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 126 (2011) (quoting Garfield
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opposed the concept of genderless marriage, there was, as
mentioned, troubling discourse in the reasoning.
During argument, the solicitor-general for the Commonwealth
was asked whether, on his argument, it was necessary to decide the
extent of the federal marriage power. 52 Mr. Gleeson SC submitted
that it was not necessary. 53 However, when pressed, he reluctantly
made the concession that the power, as a plenary power, was likely
not confined by an originalist interpretation to marriage as it was
understood in 1900, just prior to the Constitution coming into
operation. The ACT argued that the originalist interpretation was
the correct construction of the head of power and thus that it left
legislative space for the ACT legislation because same-sex marriage
was not contemplated in 1900. 54 The Court justified its interest in
this issue in observing that if the boundaries of the power were not
known, it may be possible for the ACT law to operate concurrently
and not offend section 28. 55
The curiosity of the Court and the submissions of the ACT,
supported as they were by Marriage Equality Australia and not
challenged by any contradictor, resulted in the Court proceeding

Barwick, The Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961, 3 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 277 (1961))
(stating the purpose of the legislation was to “produce a marriage code suitable to present day
Australian needs”).
52. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶ 50 (Austl.).
53. Id.; Commonwealth v ACT Hearing Transcript, supra note 44 includes the
following exchange between Mr. J.T. Gleason and Justice Hayne:
HAYNE J: Questions of constitutional power cannot go by
concession, can they, Mr Solicitor?
MR GLEESON: Your Honour, we accept entirely the thrust of these
matters. First of all, we have put something as the better view. The ACT
commends that view. The intervener enthusiastically commends that view.
The Court does not have a contradictor on that question. The Court
would not decide any matter merely on agreement. That is just not on,
absolutely not on. If the matter needs to be decided, the Court will
decide it and what I had proposed to do, given there was not a
contradictor, was to identify what I will call the narrow argument and
then deal with what I will call the broader argument.
So I will seek to identify both those arguments, there being no
contradictor. But I do not retreat from the proposition that because our
law on any view has stayed on the right side of the relevant part of the
circumference of the circle, it is either at the circumference or it is inside
it. In that sense, it is not necessary to decide the constitutional question.
54. Id. at ¶¶ 19–21, 29–38.
55. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 9.
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into an area that the Commonwealth and those who oppose
genderless marriage would have preferred left untouched. Contrary
to what it had previously observed in relation to institutional
concepts such as trademarks, juries, and marriage, it now found
obiter that any originalist argument would have to be rejected. 56 The
Commonwealth head of power extended the legalization of same-sex
marriage. It observed that the marriage head of power in the
Constitution gave the federal Parliament power not only to provide
for same-sex marriage but for the recognition of any form of
marriage between natural persons. 57
In its exploration of the issue, it made the logical connection that
the supporters of genderless marriage have long been seeking to
avoid; namely, that there is no distinction between same-sex marriage
and polygamous marriage:
The formal requirements to establish the union, and thus the
legally recognised status of marriage, may be very simple (for
example, no more than the exchange of certain promises before
witnesses). The rights and obligations which stem from that status
will commonly include rights and obligations about maintenance
and support, succession to and ownership of property (both as
between the parties to the marriage and between the parties and
others) and, if there are children of the union, rights and
obligations in relation to them.
The social institution of marriage differs from country to country.
It is not now possible (if it ever was) to confine attention to
jurisdictions whose law of marriage provides only for unions
between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others,
voluntarily entered into for life. Marriage law is and must be
recognised now to be more complex. Some jurisdictions outside
Australia permit polygamy. Some jurisdictions outside Australia, in
a variety of constitutional settings, now permit marriage between
same sex couples. 58

56. See supra note 1.
57. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxi).
58. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 34–
5 (Austl.).
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C. Criticisms of the Court’s Approach in Commonwealth v. ACT
This decision created multiple problems. First, it opened up a
political debate about what other forms of marriage the state should
recognize. Second, it created uncertainty on when groups should
intervene in cases. Third, it will lead to difficult challenges between
same-sex marriage and religious business individuals. Fourth, it dealt
with issues unnecessary to its final decision. Finally, it created a new
method of constitutional interpretation that brings with it
inherent uncertainty.
First, the decision effectively turned the issue of defining
marriage into a political matter for the federal Parliament to resolve.
It may have also fueled the debate as to just how “equal” the law
could purport to be that singled out same-gender marriage as what is
permitted by the law—more than the polygamous genie that has
been let out of the marriage-power bottle. The debate is now
genuinely raised as to why there should be criminal sanctions against
incestuous relationships and why there should be any lower limit on
the age for consenting to marriage. 59
Second, the decision not only created political and sociological
dilemmas for legislators, it also necessarily creates new uncertainties
for constitutional lawyers and for those considering intervention in
any existing High Court action. 60 The intervention of Marriage
Equality Australia in the proceedings and the quandary created by
the dicta has left religious groups wondering whether the outcome
might not have been different had they intervened after all. 61 Since
the Australian High Court’s decision, it seems that many religious
groups are now of the view that they can no longer afford not to

59. See Louise Hall, Judge Compares Incest and Paedophilia to Past Attitudes Towards
Homosexuality, Claiming They Might Not Be Taboo Anymore, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July
10, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/judge-compares-incest-and-paedophilia-to-pastattitudes-towards-homosexuality-claiming-they-might-not-be-taboo-anymore-20140709zt0v2.html; Justin Huggler, Incest a ‘Fundamental Right,’ German Committee Says, THE
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
germany/11119062/Incest-a-fundamental-right-German-committee-says.html; Bridget Brennan,
Teen Prevented From Flying Overseas “For Arranged Marriage,” AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-28/teen-preventedfrom-flying-overseas-for-arranged-marriage/5774364?WT.ac=localnews_sydney.
60. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxi).
61. Supra note 46.
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apply for leave to intervene when cases that may have implications
for religious freedom will be heard. 62
Third, as would be apparent from the letter from the Attorney
General 63 and from the following analysis, 64 the questions
surrounding same-sex marriage and discrimination against those in
homosexual relationships have become inextricably linked with
questions of freedom of conscience and religious freedom. 65 For
example, a forced “tolerance” for same-sex marriages has risen to a
new level in what has come to be referred to as the “butcher, baker
and candlestick maker” cases. 66 Despite assurances that clergy will
not be compelled to render their services or make available their
facilities to solemnize marriages of homosexual couples contrary to
their conscience, the laity of their congregations—equally people of
conscience—find themselves required to trade contrary to their
conscience. They cannot withhold support for homosexual wedding
ceremonies by declining to supply goods or services even though
their religious leaders are not required to do so. As I have noted
elsewhere, same-sex marriage rights have recently been held in New
York State to trump property rights. 67 Professor Anne Twomey
recently noted that Commonwealth v ACT has not been critically
analyzed for its implications in “butcher, baker and candlestick

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Supra note 41; Commonwealth, 88 HCA at 21; Twomey, supra note 9.
See supra text accompanying note 57.
Id.
See LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS LEGISLATION COMMITTEE REPORT
INTO THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 (Cth) §§ 2.28−29 (Austl.)
[hereinafter FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 COMMITTEE REPORT], available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constituti
onal_Affairs/Recognition_of_Foreign_Marriages_Bill_2014/~/media/Committees/legcon_ct
te/Recognition_of_Foreign_Marriages_Bill_2014/report/report.pdf; See, e.g., Christian Youth
Camps Ltd. v Cobaw & Ors (2014) 308 ALR 615 (Austl.).
67. See Neville Rochow, Same-Sex Marriage and Property Rights Compete in New York
State, in ON THE CASE ISSUE 7, available at http://www.nd.edu.au/sydney/schools/law/onthe-case/on-the-case-issue-7. In this case, the right to grant entry onto land owned and
operated by the corporate respondent and its directors was held not to extend to the telephone
call in which the complainants were informed that because of devout Catholic beliefs of the
directors they would be unable to hire out their facility. Their right to refuse entry was
abrogated by the relevant discriminatory laws protecting the sensibilities of the
complainants. Id.
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maker” cases or its relation to the interpretation of
the Constitution. 68
Fourth, the High Court decided matters beyond those necessary
to decide the case. 69 In addition to the dicta contained in ACT’s
reasoning, 70 Professor Twomey is critical of the High Court
unnecessarily going beyond the immediate decision for the case.
None of the parties before the Court placed the validity of the
Marriage Act at issue. 71 Since that was not at issue, the only question
legitimately before the Court was that of the inconsistency of the
Territory Act with the federal Act, not a hypothetical question as to
how far the legislature might be permitted to go in regulations
regarding marriage. 72
Professor Twomey observed:
Their Honours contended that it was necessary to decide whether s
51(xxi) permits the Commonwealth Parliament to enact “a law
with respect to same sex marriage because the ACT Act would
probably operate concurrently with the Marriage Act if the federal
Parliament had no power to make a national law providing for
same sex marriage.” It is hard to see how this could be the case,
given that court had earlier stated that the object of the ACT Act
was to “provide for marriage equality for same sex couples, not for
some form of legally recognised relationship which is relevantly
different from the relationship of marriage which the federal laws
provide for and recognize.” If this is so, then how could an ACT
law establishing the status of “marriage” for same sex couples,
operate concurrently with the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), if both the
Constitution and the Marriage Act defined marriage exclusively as
unions between people of the opposite sex and the Commonwealth
law covered the field of “marriage”? 73

Her point is a telling one. A law that defines, for example,
particular types of intellectual property as the only species of

68. Anne Twomey, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Interpretation, 88 AUSTL. L.
J. 613, 613–16 (2014).
69. Id. at 613.
70. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶¶ 48–61
(Austl.); See supra text accompanying note 57.
71. Twomey, supra note 68, at 613–14.
72. Id. at 613.
73. Id. at 613–14 (citations omitted).
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property that can be so defined, if valid, would leave no legislative
space for a state or territory to supplement the list of species of
property that may be described as “intellectual property.” There
would be no need, in such a case, for a court to conjecture as to
whether the Commonwealth could have added a specific supplement
to the list or even to conjecture more broadly at all. That legislative
route would be foreclosed to all other legislatures by virtue of the
Commonwealth having pronounced exclusivity. The provisions of
section 88AE of the Marriage Act could have been widened to add
states and territories same-sex marriages to those foreign marriages
that are forbidden recognition in Australia. But given that in 2004
there was no announced prospect of state- or territory-based
marriages, the intention of exclusivity of heterosexual marriage under
the Marriage Act amendments was clear enough. 74 It is
understandable that the Court should wish to deal with the
obviously related question of the extent of the legislative power in
respect to marriage so that it could return the question back to the
Parliament. But to do so without appropriate contradictors on each
of the aspects of this question was unusual and not helpful in the
long run to the conduct of the common law adversarial system.
Fifth, the High Court introduced a new method of
constitutional interpretation, “topics of juristic classification,” which
75
brings inherent uncertainty. Professor Twomey criticized the
dismissal of originalist arguments, not joined properly in the
76
arguments heard by the Court.
The contention that “marriage”
should mean the same thing as it had meant in 1900 was
dismissed peremptorily:
The utility of adopting or applying a single all-embracing theory of
constitutional interpretation has been denied. This case does not
require examination of those theories or the resolution of any
conflict, real or supposed, between them. The determinative
question in this case is whether s 51(xxi) is to be construed as
referring only to the particular legal status of “marriage” which
could be formed at the time of federation (having the legal content
which it had according to English law at that time) or as using the

74.
75.
76.

See supra text accompanying note 57.
Twomey, supra note 68, at 613.
Twomey, supra note 68, at 614–15.
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word “marriage” in the sense of a “topic of juristic classification”.
For the reasons that follow, the latter construction should be
adopted. Debates cast in terms like “originalism” or “original
intent” (evidently intended to stand in opposition to
“contemporary meaning”) with their echoes of very different
debates in other jurisdictions are not to the point and serve only to
obscure much more than they illuminate. 77

As Professor Twomey noted, “[i]n doing so, [the court] seemed
to regard such interpretative approaches as mysterious foreign
distractions that were irrelevant to its own past reasoning.” 78
Instead, it developed a new method of interpretation, not
previously used or heard of: it decided that marriage was a “topic of
juristic classification” that included “laws of a kind ‘generally
considered for comparative law and private international law, as
being the subjects of a country’s marriage laws.’” 79 By this
pronouncement, the High Court held that “the meaning of marriage
for constitutional purposes is to be interpreted by reference to the
scope of marriage laws in other countries” 80 rather than by what was
understood by the concept of marriage in 1900. 81 By this new
method of constitutional interpretation, the High Court introduced
a new set of imponderables to be explored the next time that it
examines the extent of the marriage power. It changed the power
from one that is a juristic concept accepted in Christian nations to
one that embraces marriage as it is understood, in all of its
dimensions, in any number of nations.
This new concept of “juristic classification” as a method of
constitutional interpretation brings inherent uncertainty, whereas
previously it was used only pejoratively. 82 Professor Twomey noted
that the only instance of using “a ‘topic of juristic classification” as a
means of interpreting a constitutional term appears to be the
dissenting judgment of Windeyer J, in Attorney-General (Vic) v

77. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, para 14
(Austl.) (citations omitted).
78. Twomey, supra note 68, at 614.
79. Id. (citing ACT 250 CLR, para 22).
80. Id.
81. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, ¶ 23 (Austl.);
see also Twomey, supra note 68, at 614.
82. Twomey, supra note 68, at 615.
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Commonwealth” 83 (the “Marriage Act Case”). In this case, his
Honor referred to the “concept of marriage that is universal in all
systems of law that participate in” a shared “inheritance of European
Christian civilisation.” 84 In this reference, his Honour appeared to be
adopting what would be termed an “originalist” approach
to interpretation. 85
Professor Twomey was, with respect, quite correct when she said
that the High Court could have used more orthodox methods of
constitutional interpretation to achieve the same outcome. And most
importantly, she observed that adopting the novel concept of
“juristic classification,” has left unexplained why “marriage” has been
separated out from other institutional concepts that had previously
received an originalist interpretation such as “court” and “jury.” 86
She observed in conclusion:
As same-sex marriage has not been recognised yet in a
majority of countries, it would appear that this topic of juristic
classification can be affected by the laws of a minority of countries
and as the High Court understandably is no longer prepared to
draw distinctions between countries, such as “Christian countries”
and others, then the potential is opened for laws of even the most
oppressive countries to affect a topic of juristic classification in
Australia. Moreover, as noted above, it seems that some aspects of
the constitutional meaning of marriage can be changed by
reference to laws adopted in other countries (such as polygamy and
same-sex marriage) but that other aspects, such as the consensual
nature of marriage and the intention that it endure, remain
immutable and unaffected by foreign law. No explanation was
given as to why this was so, leaving this new method of
constitutional interpretation shrouded in uncertainty.
. . . . The risk of establishing new methods of constitutional
interpretation is that one can never be sure where they might lead.
While the most likely outcome is that the pool of topics of juristic
classification will remain stagnant with no new entries, this

83. Id.
84. Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529, 578 (Austl.)
(Windeyer, J., dissenting).
85. Twomey, supra note 68, at 615.
86. Id. at 615−16.
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judgment might yet give birth to more surprising developments in
the future. 87

Whatever other consequences of the decision in Commonwealth v
ACT, two are certain: first, that the matter of same-sex marriage has
now been returned to the federal Parliament as a political issue;
second, that future cases involving homosexual rights will attract
applications for intervention from both sides of the debate. But the
consequences in ACT did not extend as far as those in Baskin.
IV. BASKIN V. BOGAN; WOLF V. WALKER 88
While the courts in ACT and Baskin were both deciding similar
issues and coming to opposite conclusions, the approaches could not
be more different. Despite the criticisms made by both Professor
Twomey and me, the High Court adopted and maintained the
legalistic approach that it is known for. In contrast, in Baskin, the
circuit court embarked upon inquiries into factual matters the
relevance of which is not altogether obvious to the issue decided. It
does so reaching conclusions that would seem to be either contrary
to known evidence or that would, despite the reasoning available on
the record, remain contestable. Also, if the reasons for the decision
are a true guide to the arguments put to the court by the states, they
seem to have omitted a number of quite obvious arguments. This
section will begin by addressing some general, broad criticisms of the
Baskin decision before moving on to specific arguments that the
court relied on to justify same-sex marriage without regard to
evidence that ran contrary to the court’s conclusions.
A. General Criticism of Baskin
Baskin had several major flaws. First, it made unsupported
predictions about the trend of same-sex marriage. Second, it
assumed that it was in the best position to know a state’s purpose in
supporting heterosexual marriages.

87. Id.
88. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v.
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct.
316 (2014).
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That the decision was going to be controversial is evident from
the first line when Judge Posner, delivering the opinion on behalf of
the court, makes a prediction as to the trend of same-sex marriage in
the United States. “Indiana and Wisconsin are among the shrinking
majority of states that do not recognize the validity of same-sex
marriages, whether contracted in these states or in states (or foreign
countries) where they are lawful.” 89 The prediction implicit in the
adjective “shrinking” predicts not only political outcomes, but also
judicial outcomes at first instance on appeal to intermediate courts 90
and, of course, the now well-publicized case of Kitchen v. Herbert
regarding the validity of Utah’s heterosexual marriage laws,
enshrined in its constitution. 91
In the next paragraph of the decision, the controversial nature of
the reasoning and decision is confirmed:
Formally, these cases are about discrimination against the small
homosexual minority in the United States. But at a deeper level, as
we shall see, they are about the welfare of American children. The
argument that the states press hardest in defense of their
prohibition of same-sex marriage is that the only reason the
government encourages marriage is to induce heterosexuals to
marry so that there will be fewer “accidental births,” which when
they occur outside of marriage often lead to the abandonment of
the child to the mother (unaided by the father) or to foster care.
Overlooked by this argument is that many of those abandoned
children are adopted by homosexual couples, and those children
would be better off both emotionally and economically if their
adoptive parents were married. 92

For a lawyer not as well acquainted with Fourteenth Amendment
issues central to this case as American lawyers would be, the first
surprise of this case is why the court is permitting parties to embark
on this kind of factual defense of the legislature’s will. In Australia,
this type of question would be the subject of a parliamentary inquiry
through an appropriate committee. This was the case in the recently

89. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 653.
90. Such as the decision that went contrary to the prediction in Robicheaux v.
Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014).
91. 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014); stay
granted, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).
92. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 654.
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released Senate inquiry into whether a bill for the recognition in
Australia of foreign same-sex marriages should be passed, upon
inquiry and consideration of the evidence. On the evidence, the
Senate did not recommend that the bill be passed. 93 Unless a
legislature has acted beyond its constitutional power, the reasons for
the law would seem to be a matter for the legislature. 94
Second, if such an inquiry is relevant under the American
constitutional Fourteenth Amendment principle of “reasonable
basis,” then surely the argument above, as explained by Judge
Posner, could not possibly have been the best argument that could
have been put forward by the states. Evaluative evidence as to what
is in the best interests of the community, particularly children, is
available now in a number of well-documented longitudinal studies.
And the argument would not just be one of encouraging marriage,
surely, but of the welfare of children in marriages where there are
parents of both genders, ideally their biological parents. Allied to
this, at the community level, is the impact that same-sex marriage has
had on existing freedoms, among which the rights to freedom of
conscience and freedom of religious practice are foremost. It is now
well established in American jurisprudence, to which I will return, 95
that in this contest of rights, both freedoms suffer.
Third, the judicial assertion begs yet a further question; whether
all types of marriages are in the best interests of the child. But even
assuming such a question were to be the subject of the court’s
inquiry, how does an intermediate court of appeal ascertain those
facts on what are clearly contentious and complex questions of
sociological fact and data collection? This judicial assertion is as
astounding for its peremptory dismissal of the argument that
provoked it as it is for the forensic leaps that inhere in it.

93. FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 66, at ss
2.55−2.56, at 17. Details of the Bill are available at: http://www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s963.
94. FOREIGN MARRIAGES BILL 2014 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 66, at s 2.55,
at 17.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 277 et seq.
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B. Baskin’s Faulty Reasoning

In the criticism made here of Baskin, first is a consolidation of
general criticisms made of the decision by the conservative Internet
commentators together with my own observations. 96 I then turn to
some specific criticisms that could be leveled at the case from an
Australian perspective, including evidence that does not appear to
have been considered by the Court. 97
The reasoning of Judge Posner seems to rest on four critical
points. First, infertility does not prevent other couples from
marrying. Second, homosexuality is an inherited orientation. Third,
same-sex marriage does no harm to the existing institution of
marriage. Fourth, same-sex marriages will benefit children. On each
of these points, the reasoning is superficial.
1. Infertile couples
First, the court dismissed the State’s arguments in favor of
heterosexual marriage in part because of the issue of the infertility of
homosexual marriages. 98 If the reasons fairly represent the argument
as made, it seems the argument was rather poorly framed. But the

96. Unlike the ACT case, the decision in Baskin has received criticism from a number
of conservative Internet commentators who have criticized it as being amoral pro-homosexual
marriage polemic. See Baskin 766 F.3d; Michael Cook, A Deeply Amoral Deference of Same-Sex
Marriage, CONJUGALITY (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.mercatornet.com/conjugality/
view/14767; State is “Fake Church” Imposing its Own Form of Morality on All, THE
CHRISTIAN INST., (Sept. 22 1014), http://www.christian.org.uk/news/state-is-fake-churchimposing-its-own-form-of-morality-on-all/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&
utm_campaign=Feed%3A+christianinstitutereligiousliberty+%28The+Christian+Institute+%C2
%BB+Religious+liberty%29&utm_content=FeedBurner. In fairness, it should be noted that
pro-gay websites have praised the decision as an unanswerable disposal of all of the arguments
against same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Michelle Dean, Hero Federal Appeals Judge Burns Down the
Case Against Gay Marriage, GAWKER (Sept. 5, 2014, 9:49 AM), http://gawker.com/herofederal-appeals-judge-burns-down-the-case-against-1630697112.
97. It should be noted that much of the alleged financial and proprietary discrimination
that is considered in the reasons would not be relevant in Australia because of the state and
federal legislation to which I have already referred. See supra note 27. Those are matters on
which I cannot be critical of the Court. It seems rather an omission of the respective
legislatures to have made any allowance in the law for the manner in which people in
relationships outside marriage may want to arrange their affairs. It may be this oversight on the
part of lawmakers that explains the haste with which same-sex marriage was adopted in the
United States.
98. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub
nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
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judicial riposte is equally jejune. Judge Posner points out that
Indiana bans marriages of first cousins until they are well past the age
of procreation at age sixty-five. “Elderly first cousins are permitted to
marry because they can’t produce children; homosexuals are
forbidden to marry because they can’t produce children.” 99 But
surely, the focus in the case of homosexual couples is whether they
are appropriate candidates for adoption in the first place. Would the
state laws permit these sexagenarians to be adoptive parents? If not,
it is not their reproductive status that is at issue but their
inappropriateness as adoptive parents. That is the question that must
be asked of the homosexual couple, which would require detailed
sociological analysis. While single-sex upbringing is a fact of life in,
say, the case of aunts or uncles or other relatives that may be charged
with the upbringing of a child, they are exceptional and should not
be legislated as the default position.
In fairness to Judge Posner, the question put by the court to
Indiana’s counsel “you agree same-sex couples can successfully raise
children, why shouldn’t the ban be lifted as to them?” did not
receive the most persuasive of responses. 100 It gave rise to derision in
the reasons. 101 This derision could have been avoided if the response
had been that the State’s policy was based upon the most credible
evidence available as to the durability of homosexual relationships
and the outcomes for children that have reached adulthood in
relationships other than with their biological parents. If Indiana had
taken this approach, the court would have had much less capacity to
deride, particularly if that evidence were, as it should have been, the
subject of submissions. That would surely have gone some distance
to satisfying the test laid down in United States v. Virginia and
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan that there was an
important governmental objective substantially related to the
discriminatory means used to achieve it. 102

99. Id.
100. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 662. The lawyer responded by saying, “the assumption is that
with opposite-sex couples there is very little thought given during the sexual act, sometimes, to
whether babies may be a consequence.” Id.
101. Id.
102. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
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2. The genetic argument
Second, Judge Posner concludes that homosexual orientation is
genetic, an immutable and innate characteristic. To support this, his
Honor cites a 2008 brochure from the American Psychological
Association and scholarly articles in much the way that a court might
refer to academic opinion on a point of economic theory. 103 But the
outcome here is not a question of whether corporate behavior
contravenes a statute but rather whether a constitutional principle
should be invoked to invalidate state legislation with the effect of
changing the long established social and legal institution of
marriage—a matter, it might be suggested, that requires somewhat
more certainty than contestable academic opinion. No other
evidence seems to have been made available to the court on this
point. And on this basis, his Honor concludes as a fact the genetic
origins of the proclivity. However, it seems well-known that contrary
opinions hold that no genetic cause has yet been identified;
homosexuality’s origin is still an open question.
There is, for instance, also the contrary argument that if
homosexuality was genetic, it should have disappeared according to
evolutionary theory: homosexuals do not produce offspring. 104 Judge
Posner acknowledges that this is a problem, but says that the “kin
105
selection hypothesis,” also known as “inclusive fitness theory,”
shows that homosexuality is compatible with evolutionary theory. 106
What Judge Posner fails to refer to is that the kin selection
hypothesis or inclusive fitness theory is controversial and has been
severely criticized by scientists, including the Harvard evolutionary
biologist who first popularized the theory, Edward Wilson:
Inclusive fitness theory is not a simplification over the standard
approach. It is an alternative accounting method, but one that
works only in a very limited domain. Whenever inclusive fitness
does work, the results are identical to those of the standard

103. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 657–58, 666–68 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied
sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
104. See id.
105. See id.; William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of altruistic behavior, 1963 AM. NAT.
97, 354–56.
106. See id. at 657–58.
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approach. Inclusive fitness theory is an unnecessary detour, which
does not provide additional insight or information. 107

The genetic origin of homosexuality is unsettled and contestable.
This presents what appears to be a fundamental flaw in this part of
the opinion. The case illustrates that the Court was hardly the right
venue for the resolution of issues of strongly contested evolutionary
theory in order to effect constitutional and social change.
3. No harm to society or the institution of marriage
Third, comes the reasoning that same-sex marriage does no harm
to the institution of marriage or to society at large. This is an
assertion that may be impossible to prove in less than two
generations. Judge Posner seems quite impressed by a recent study
which analyzed whether marriage rates fell after Massachusetts
permitted same-sex marriage. “[A]llowing same-sex marriage has no
effect on the heterosexual marriage rate,” 108 he concludes. But this is
not to the point. How could a snapshot of Massachusetts marriages
from 2004 to 2010 be expected to say anything worthwhile about
the effect upon an international and centuries-old institution? And,
as has already been mentioned, his Honor’s treatment of the
implications for children seems superficial and poorly reasoned in
the extreme. 109
4. Benefits to children
Fourth, Judge Posner confirms that the welfare of children
should be at the front and center of arguments about marriage. 110
Since marriage is the best place to raise children, he argues, it is
discriminatory to deny homosexual couples the right to raise their
children within the framework of marriage. 111
But he only considers the material benefits of a hefty household
income and the psychological comforts of having one’s parents be
107. Martin A. Nowak, Corina E. Tarnita, & Edward O. Wilson, The Evolution of
Eusociality, 466 NATURE 1057, 1059 (2010).
108. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 668 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub
nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
110. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663.
111. See id.
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married. 112 The real question that should have been addressed is
whether a marriage with a mother and a father is the best place to
raise children. Judge Posner ignores almost completely the
psychological effects on children of growing up in a homosexual
marriage, focused as he is on the rights of adults. It is these effects,
as well as others, that this paper will now address.
V. TYPES OF EVIDENTIARY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
OVERLOOKED IN BASKIN
It is not just the way in which the court in Baskin dealt with the
evidence and arguments that were before it or that it assimilated into
its reasons that is troubling. Rather, it is what was not considered in
the reasons that is particularly alarming. It is a demonstration that
the curial process is not well suited to the type of policy
considerations and judicial activism on which the court embarked.
In the case of Baskin, the burden on the State should have been
relatively light given the conjectural nature of the support for the
same-sex side of the argument. And so, at some stage in the process,
it must fall to the complainant to show that there is not only a
deficiency in the evidence adduced by the State in showing its
reasonableness in so discriminating, but also that there is good
reason why the court should not discriminate. Just how strong is the
justification for same-sex marriage? A logical answer to that question
seems to be missing from Baskin. Yet, it is not at all self-evident.
There were many stronger arguments that needed consideration
other than this strawman. What follows are examples of the types of
arguments and evidence that a thoroughgoing consideration would
be likely to take into account. It starts with the statistical advantages
of marriage. It then moves to the benefits to children of a stable
marriage between their biological parents. It finishes with the
statistical disadvantages of parenting outside of traditional marriage.
A. Statistical Advantages of Heterosexual Marriage
There is one matter on which Judge Posner is correct, despite his
failure to cite supporting evidence: marriage is a “socially beneficial

112.

Baskin, 766 F.3d at 664.
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institution.” 113 However, his Honor overlooked the fact that the vast
bulk of the statistical evidence gathered has been about heterosexual
marriage and the evidence regarding the comparability of
homosexual marriage is either too new or longitudinally insufficient
to compare the outcomes for both types of relationship. Some of the
evident benefits of heterosexual marriage are outlined below: 114
• Married people are more productive, have higher incomes,
and enjoy more family time than the unmarried due to the
division of specialization of labor. 115
• Married men earn between 10% and 40% more than similarly
situated unmarried men. 116
• Married mothers are less likely to live in poverty. 117
• Children are less likely, statistically, to live in poverty if they
are raised by biological parents whose marriage endures. 118
• Married men and women lead healthier lives than
the unmarried. 119
• Married women more often have access to health
insurance. 120
• Divorced and widowed men and women are more likely to
get into arguments and fights and to do dangerous things. 121
• Married couples lead more ordered lives, with healthier
eating and sleeping habits and take fewer chances that could
cause accidents. 122
113. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub
nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); see also William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership
Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961, 991 n.185. See also
the contrasting evidence arising from other studies discussed below at the text accompanying
notes 153 and following.
114. For a general bibliography, see Why Marriage Matters: Economic Impact, FOR YOUR
MARRIAGE, http://www.foryourmarriage.org/economic-impact/ (last visited March 13,
2015), at which each of the works cited are referenced.
115. Id.
116. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA WHITEHEAD, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS
16 (2005).
117. WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: 10 PRINCIPLES
20 (2006).
118. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: 26 CONCLUSIONS
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 19 (2005).
119. KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO” 30 (2012) (discussing drinking, substance abuse,
drinking and driving and generally living dangerously among single men).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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•

Marriage
improves
both
men’s
and
women’s
psychological well-being. 123
• Married men and women have statistically longer lives than
the unmarried. 124
• Married men and women statistically have lower rates of
contracting cancer and it seems that marriage offers a better
chance of survival in the event of diagnosis. 125
• Those who are married have statistically lower incidents of
premature deaths from cardiovascular disease, hypertension,
pneumonia, and stroke. 126
• The married have statistically fewer mental problems and
tend to smoke and drink much less than separated or
divorced men and women. 127
• Marital status has a stronger correlation with age at death
than socioeconomic status for most major causes. 128
The research does seem unanimous to the effect that marrying
and remaining married bring better health outcomes than any other
form of lifestyle. The research also seems to be unanimous across
jurisdictional boundaries, whether in the United States, Britain,
Canada, or Australia. 129
In relation to a survey of almost 40,000 Australians to which
Kevin Andrews refers, 130 researcher Jonathan Kelley observes, “It
isn’t just that happier people marry but when we follow single
people over time, we find their happiness is actually boosted by
131
marriage.” Of course, Andrews and Kelley are both referring to
longitudinal studies of heterosexual marriage. The evidence so far
available on homosexual relationships is discussed in the section
“How same-sex relationships compare” below. 132

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO” 30 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO” 31–32 (2012).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part V.C.2.
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B. The Benefits of Stable Marriage between Biological
Parents for Children
The evidence not only indicates that marriage favors the
wellbeing of adults, but, even more importantly, enhances in marked
ways the happiness, health, and adjustment of children. Children
who are raised by their two biological parents within a stable
marriage enjoy significant advantages. Whether it be in terms of
better health, 133 enjoyment of subsequent adult relationships, 134 or
educational outcomes, 135 children from stable marriages are
significantly better off. With respect to the research on educational
outcomes, Andrews observes:
Families are one of the strongest influences on the growth of
human confidence, mental and emotional wellbeing and physical
health. Four decades ago, the Coleman report identified the family
rather than the school as the major determinant of learning
outcomes for children. The results have been replicated many
times. Children of Indochinese refugees, who had missed months,
even years of schooling, and had lived in relocation camps, with
scant exposure to western culture and little knowledge of the
English language, were found to achieve remarkable success. The
stunning success was not found in the schools that they had
originally come from or to which they subsequently attended, but
attributable to their family environment. This is just one illustration
of the powerful impact of stable marriage and family life on
educational outcomes for children.
Children who grow up in an intact family achieve higher school
scores, report significantly less school-related behavioural problems
and higher aspirations for tertiary studies. They also receive greater
parental nurturance, mentoring and advising. 136

C. Statistical Disadvantages of Parenting Outside of
Traditional Marriage
What is also absent from the reasoning in Baskin is whether
relationships other than traditional marriage can be beneficial to
133.
134.
135.
136.
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Id. beginning at 55.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67–68.
KEVIN ANDREWS, “MAYBE I DO” 67 (2012).
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children. This is again a serious oversight in the reasoning of the
case. It is clear, from the above examples, which reflect only a small
fraction of the research that has been done, that stable marriage
between biological parents is the best predictor of good outcomes
for adults and children and a net contributor to social stability.
This section shows this through a few different sets of statistics.
First, it will address the social and economic costs of divorce and
family breakdown. Second, it will move to a comparison of
heterosexual and homosexual parenting by looking at two things: 1)
the uncertain or inconclusive findings on the potentially negative
impact on children of same-sex parents and 2) the difference in
divorce rates between heterosexual and homosexual parents.
1. The social and economic costs of divorce and family breakdown
In a recent article, social commentator Bettina Arndt cited a
British High Court Judge, Sir Paul Coleridge, who observed that
“couples” shouldn’t have children if their relationship is not stable
enough to merit getting married. 137 Speaking shortly before his
retirement after a distinguished career in family law, the Judge
challenged the common notion that it makes no difference whether
parents cohabit or marry. “One [arrangement] tends to last and the
other doesn’t. . . . [C]hildren with unmarried parents were twice as
likely to suffer a family break-up as those with married parents. The
proportion of children born to unmarried parents in Britain reached
a record 47.5 per cent [in 2012].” 138
Referring to a Brookings Institution report, Arndt goes on to
make the following observations:
The result, according to the report, is a growing social divide, with
well-educated people still tending to marry and then have children,
while lower socio-economic groups are more likely to have children
in de facto relationships. These children often end up in singleparent families. This emerging difference in marriage patterns is

137. Bettina Arndt, The Unspoken Truth About Marriage and Kids, THE AGE (Dec., 16,
2013,
available
at
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/the-unspoken-truth-aboutmarriage-and-kids-20131215-2zf3f.html.
138. Id. (quoting Sir Paul Coleridge, British High Court Judge who was citing Marriage
Foundation research).
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adding to the gap between the haves and the have-nots, increasing
social disadvantage.
Of course there are de facto couples with lasting relationships and
thriving children, but the broader patterns tell a different story –
just as the 90-year-old who smokes has no bearing on the link
between cigarettes and health risks. . .
The media is part of the problem, given in their number are more
than a fair share of cohabiting couples. . . .
Public discussion of this important social trend is discouraged by
media players who won’t acknowledge that their preferred lifestyle
choices have very different consequences on the other side of the
social divide – yet the impact on kids of the casualisation of family
relations is no laughing matter. 139

Millions of children are victims of adult selfishness. These
phenomena are also indelibly etched into our national psyche and
form part of our history that brings us shame. And it is as if the
national disgrace of children being the victims of divorce were not
enough. We have also in our recent history an acknowledgement of
the “Stolen Generation” of Aboriginal children taken from their
biological mothers in the 1940s and 1950s to be raised in Caucasian
families. 140 There have also been Royal Commissions into this and
other abuses of children in both publicly funded 141 and religiously
organized institutions. 142 As a nation, Australia should certainly pause
before racing headlong into any other change in social policy that
would impact upon children, as marriage necessarily does. And a
court such as that presided over by Judge Posner ought to have done
the same.

139. Id. (citing Brookings Institution, Knot Yet: The Future of Marriage in the U.S.,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/3/20-knot-yet-marriage/
20130320_knot_yet_marriage_transcript.pdf).
140. See Australian Human Rights Commission, Bringing them home: The ‘Stolen
Children’ Report (1997), available at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/aboriginaland-torres-strait-islander-social-justice/publications/bringing-them-home-stolen.
141. Mullighan Inquiry, GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.sa.gov.au/topics/crime-justice-and-the-law/mullighan-inquiry
(concerning
public institutional abuse).
142. ROYAL COMMISSION INTO INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO CHILD SEX ABUSE, 142,
available at http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/ (last visited March 14, 2015).
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Despite these glaring warnings of how society can systemically
fail innocent children with alarming indifference, one is compelled to
ask whether the lesson has yet been properly learned. Some social
trends still move alarmingly towards the denial of the child’s ability
to identify with and live with their biological parents. Two of the
foremost scholars on family, Wilcox and Marquardt, have recently
expressed the social trend in these terms:
Throughout history, marriage has first and foremost been an
institution for procreation and raising children. It has provided the
cultural tie that seeks to connect the father to his children by
binding him to the mother of his children. Yet in recent times,
children have been increasingly pushed from center stage. 143

One of America’s most prominent legal scholars and social
commentators, Professor Mary Ann Glendon, described the current
law and attitude towards marriage and divorce in these terms:
The [current] American story about marriage, as told in the law
and in much popular literature, goes something like this: marriage
is a relationship that exists primarily for the fulfilment of the
individual spouses. If it ceases to perform this function, no one is
to blame and either spouse may terminate it at will. . . . Children
hardly appear in the story; at most they are rather shadowy
characters in the background. 144

And former University of Chicago Law School professor,
Brigham Young University president, Utah State Supreme Court
Justice, and current international religious leader, Dallin Oaks,
observed as follows: 145
There are surely cases when a divorce is necessary for the good of
the children but those circumstances are exceptional. In most
marital contests the contending parents should give much greater
weight to the interests of the children. . . . Children need the
emotional and personal strength that come from being raised by

143. THE NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN
AMERICA 82 (2011).
144. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 108 (1987).
145. Dallin H. Oaks, Protect the Children, ENSIGN, Nov. 2012, audio and visual
recordings available at https://www.lds.org/general-conference/2012/10/protect-thechildren?lang=eng.
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two parents who are united in their marriage and their goals. As
one who was raised by a widowed mother, I know first hand that
this cannot always be achieved, but it is the ideal to be sought
whenever possible.
Children are the first victims of the current laws permitting socalled “no-fault divorce.” From the standpoint of children, divorce
is too easy. Summarizing decades of social science research, a
careful scholar concluded that “the family structure that produces
the best outcomes for children, on average, are two biological
parents who remain married.” 146 A New York Times writer noted,
“the striking fact that even as traditional marriage has declined in
the United States . . . the evidence has mounted for the
institution’s importance to the wellbeing of children.” 147 That
reality should give important guidance to parents and parents-to-be
in their decisions involving marriage and divorce. We also need
politicians, policymakers, and officials to increase their attention to
what is best for children in contrast to the selfish interests of voters
and vocal advocates of adult interests. . . . We should assume the
same disadvantages for children raised by couples of the same
gender. The social science literature is controversial and politically
charged on the long-term effect of this on children, principally
because, as the New York Times writer observed, “same-sex
marriage is a social experiment, and like most social experiments it
will take time to understand its consequences.” 148

The reasoning of Judge Posner on behalf of the court falters not
only by the logical omission of the above considerations, but if all of
the available evidence were carefully considered, the result should
have been the other way. That evidence shows that children whose
biological parents have always been married enjoy higher grades at
school, greater educational achievements, and live longer and
happier lives with a better chance for success in their own marriages
when they reach adulthood. 149 The opposite occurs when they are

146. Id. (quoting CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA,
1960-2010, at 158 (2012)).
147. Id. (quoting Ross Douthat, Gay Parents and the Marriage Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June
11,
2012,
http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/gay-parents-and-themarriage-debate).
148. Id.
149. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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subjected to the turmoil of divorce and relationship breakdown. 150 It
is the children who are clearly the major casualties of the poor
personal and social choices made by those who care for them.
Marriage is, on the evidence, the optimal circumstance in which they
should be raised. Heterosexual nuclear family marriage is capable of
being put up successfully against any other form of social experiment
on how the family should be arranged.
The other side of the marriage equation that has to be evaluated
is the cost of divorce. Whereas a stable marriage is a net contributor
to society as well as the wellbeing of all of the members of the family
151
that is based upon that marriage, divorce is a net cost to the
community. A recent Newscorp analysis of information from the
Australian Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of
Human Services has shown that the financial cost of divorce annually
152
is a huge one. Each Australian taxpayer now pays about $1,100.00
per year to support families in crisis. The figures that were analyzed
in respect of the current financial year show that “the government
will spend $12.5 billion on support payments to single parents,
including tax benefits and rent assistance. Another $1.5 billion will
be spent on the administration of the child support system, while the
cost to taxpayers from family disputes in Australian courts is $202
million [each year].” 153
The results of one of those studies conducted by Judith
Wallerstein, who started interviewing a group of 131 children in
1975 are compelling. 154 These were children whose parents were all
going through a divorce. 155 Wallerstein asked the children to tell her
about the intimate details of their lives, which they did with
remarkable candor. What was unique about the published study was
that the researcher, Wallerstein, stayed in contact with the group of
131 children, along with a control group of children who were in
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Lauren Wilson & Lisa Cornish, Divorce Is Costing The Australian Economy $14
NEWS.COM.AU
(July
5,
2014,
10:52
PM),
Billion
A
Year,
http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/relationships/divorce-is-costing-the-australian-economy14-billion-a-year/story-fnet09y4-1226979027353.
153. Id.
154. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE
UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY xix (2001).
155. Id.
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stable families, for a quarter of a century. One social commentator
cited the following passage from the authors in a review:
From the viewpoint of children, and counter to what happens to
their parents, divorce is a cumulative experience. Its impact
increases over time and rises to a crescendo in adulthood. At each
developmental stage divorce is experienced anew in different ways.
In adulthood it affects personality, the ability to trust, expectations
about relationships, and ability to cope with change. . . . But it’s in
adulthood that children of divorce suffer the most. The impact of
divorce hits them most cruelly as they go in search of love, sexual
intimacy, and commitment. Their lack of inner images of a man
and woman in a stable relationship and their memories of their
parents’ failure to sustain the marriage badly hobbles their search,
leading them to heartbreak and even despair. . . . [C]hildren of
divorce and those in happy intact families live in separate albeit
parallel universes. . . . What about the children? In our rush to
improve the lives of adults, we assumed that their lives would
improve as well. We made radical changes in the family without
realizing how it would change the experience of growing up. We
embarked on a gigantic social experiment without any idea about
how the next generation would be affected. 156

Social science is teaching us that marriage alone cannot be the
best of outcomes. It must be a stable marriage of a couple of
opposite sex. Furthermore, policy needs to encourage that outcome.
This is precisely what history and common sense should have told us
already. Social and economic costs and loss of social capital are
bound up with failure to encourage stable marriage. The evidence
behooves all legislators and policymakers to do all they can to
preserve the institution of stable marriage between biological
parents. Recognizing that departures from this ideal will, from time
to time, arise or become necessary, legislators should not, on the
evidence, lightly depart from marriage.
A court charged with a decision as important as that in Baskin
needs to look to what will produce the best outcomes for the next
generation. This raises a couple of questions. Is experimentation with

156. Bill Muehlenberg, A Review of The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce by Judith
Wallerstein, CULTURE WATCH, http://billmuehlenberg.com/2000/09/15/a-review-of-theunexpected-legacy-of-divorce-by-judith-wallerstein/ (last visited March 10, 2015) (quoting
WALLERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 298–99, 22, xxviii).
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other forms of parenting justified and can society afford the
potential costs?
2. How same-sex relationships compare
No comparison was undertaken by the Court in Baskin between
the relative social benefits of heterosexual marriage and homosexual
marriage, possibly because the evidence is scant. But such evidence as
there is places a heavy persuasive burden upon the supporters of
same-sex marriage that has not been discharged. 157
In fact, one of the constant refrains used by same-sex marriage
supporters is that there is nothing to fear because nothing will really
change if same-sex marriage becomes legal in Australia. 158 This seems
counterintuitive and is contrary to the evidence available from
overseas in critical areas of social concern. Specifically, same-sex
parents have potentially negative effects upon their children a) in
general and b) through a higher rate of divorce than for heterosexual
marriages. 159 In short, the claims of no change or even of only
minimal change are untrue.
a. Same-sex parenting. Studies looking at the effects of same-sex
parents on their children have not conclusively shown that this form
of parenting is the same as or better than heterosexual parenting.
While there are studies suggesting findings in favor of same-sex
parents, those studies have many weaknesses that make it nearly
impossible to safely rely on their findings. There is at least enough
uncertainty as to the benefits to the child for one to take care and
time in promoting same-sex parenting as an acceptable social
institution. This section will focus on an Australian study and detail
its problems with methodology, contradictions, and ethics.
There is an overall problem with any sociological evidence that is
examined in relation to same-sex parenting. Neither side of the
debate can claim to have had sufficient time for the experiment of
157. See supra text accompanying notes 124–43.
158. David Penberthy, Nothing to Fear About Gay Marriage, THE ADVERTISER
(Adelaide,
Austl.)
(Apr.
20,
2013,
11:30
PM),
http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/opinion/david-penberthy-nothing-to-fear-about-gaymarriage/story-e6freabc-1226625060309.
159. This section does not discuss other harms to the society from losses of freedoms of
speech, conscience, and religion.
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same-sex parenting to be rigorously tested with sufficient data over
time and large sample sizes. However, those studies that have been
undertaken cannot be interpreted as auguring well. In fact, one of
the latest and most thorough studies finds significant disadvantages
reported by young adults with a parent who had same-sex
relationships prior to the child’s turning eighteen. 160 With stains on
our nation’s history pages in actions taken at the expense of children
(such as the Stolen Generation and other instances of institutional
child abuse as referred to above) these findings should not be
ignored or rejected out of hand. Yet, that seems to be precisely what
is being advocated by a number of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and
transgender (LGBT) activists and their sympathizers. 161
Studies in this area produce a great deal of controversy. 162 There
is an obvious temptation to exaggerate the benefits. It is also
tempting, possibly, to jump the gun on proper research
methodology. One of the current controversies relates to the most
recent Australian study done on child health in same-sex families,
most of which coverage has been positive: The Australian Study of
Child Health in Same-Sex Families or ACHESS. 163 ACHESS had “a
convenience sample of 390 parents from Australia who self-identified
as same-sex attracted and had children aged 0-17 years. Parentreported, multidimensional measures of child health and wellbeing
and the relationship to perceived stigma were measured.” 164 The selfidentified volunteers for the study—some 315 parents—represented
500 children, eighty percent of them with female index parent and
eighteen percent with a male index parent. 165

160. See Mark Regnerus, How Different Are Adult Children of Parents Who Have
Same-Sex Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures, 41 SOC. SCI. RESEARCH
752 (2012).
161. See supra notes 136–37. See also Ilana Yurkiewicz, Why Mark Regnerus Study
Shouldn’t Matter, Even if it Were the Most Scientifically Robust Study in the World, SCIENTIFIC
AM. BLOG (Jun. 16, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/unofficial-prognosis/whymark-regnerus-study-shouldnt-matter-even-if-it-were-the-most-scientifically-robust-study-inthe-world/.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 174–75.
163. Simon R. Crouch et al., Parent-Reported Measures of Child Health and Wellbeing in
Same-Sex Parent Families: A Cross-Sectional Survey, BMC PUB. HEALTH 14:635 (June 21,
2014), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/14/635/abstract.
164. Id. at 1.
165. Id. at 6.
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One critic observed the reaction to the study’s findings:
The latest “research” about same-sex parenting was published in
Australia to considerable fanfare because it “found” that children’s
well-being with homosexual parents was as good or better than
with heterosexual parents. Any problems faced by the children were
attributed to the “stigma” associated with homosexual parenting.
The lead author, Simon Crouch, claimed in the Conversation, “It is
liberating for parents to take on roles that suit their skills rather
than defaulting to gender stereotypes, where mum is the primary
caregiver and dad the primary breadwinner. Our research suggests
that abandoning such gender stereotypes might be beneficial to
child health.” 166

But ACHESS is the subject of serious criticism on a number of
methodological bases. 167 The popular press coverage has not
disclosed serious methodological weaknesses in ACHESS, as pointed
out by Mark Regnerus 168 and by Janice Crouse (author of Children
at Risk 169 and executive director and senior fellow at Concerned
Women for America’s Beverly La Haye Institute). 170
The first weakness is that the study uses self-registration rather
than random sampling. Regnerus cites the following in the
methodology section: “The convenience sample was recruited using
online and traditional recruitment techniques, accessing same-sex
attracted parents through news media, community events and
community groups. Three hundred and ninety eligible parents
contacted the researchers . . . .” 171 Regnerus then points to the
sampling distortion and bias inherent in the methodology leading to
the conclusion by referring to the sampling approach announced two
years before the study was completed:

166. Janice Shaw Crouse, What About That Australian Study About Same-Sex Parenting?,
THE AM. SPECTATOR (July 18, 2014), http://spectator.org/articles/60001/what-aboutaustralian-study-about-same-sex-parenting.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 183–85.
168. Mark Regnerus, Is Same-Sex Parenting Better for Kids? The New Australian Study
Can’t Tell Us, THE WITHERSPOON INST. (July 9, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com
/2014/07/13451/.
169. JANICE SHAW CROUSE, CHILDREN AT RISK: THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF
CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING IN AMERICA (2010).
170. Crouse, supra note 166.
171. Regnerus, supra note 168.
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“Initial recruitment will . . . include advertisements and media
releases in the gay and lesbian press, flyers at gay and lesbian social
and support groups, and investigator attendance at gay and lesbian
community events . . . . Primarily recruitment will be through
emails posted on gay and lesbian community email lists aimed at
same-sex parenting. This will include but not be limited to, Gay
Dads Australia and the Rainbow Families Council of Victoria.” 172

There are two major problems with this approach for sampling.
First, the criticism that Regnerus levels at this methodology is that it
does not produce a study of average same-sex households with
children. 173 He says that to compare the results of this study with
that of any “population-based sample of everyone else is . . . suspect
science.” 174 As a further explanation, Crouse notes that
[Crouch] admits that convenience samples “are fraught with
problems” . . . and notes that the parents’ level of education is
skewed to higher education—73 percent have at least an
undergraduate degree, with nearly half (46 percent) holding
graduate degrees. Income level, too, is skewed, with 81 percent
earning at least $60,000 and more than a quarter earning more
than $100,000, nearly 20 percent earning $150,000 to $249,999,
and 14 percent earning $250,000 plus. 175

On this point, Crouse observes that Crouch “notes the
significance of the differences in education and income; both he and
others note that having more lesbian index parents and a shortage of
male ones also significantly skews the data.” 176
Second, all of the participants in the study were well aware of the
political import of the study topic and an unknown number of the
participants signed up for that very reason. 177 In Crouse’s special
report, she comments that its credibility is impaired by the fact that
it is the gay parents who are giving themselves good ratings. 178 As she
points out:
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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Homosexual activists have been jubilant and have engaged in a
public relations campaign, conveniently blurring the lines between
fact and fiction. For instance, the activists imply that children
actually participated when, in fact, the parents answered for the
children and the children had no involvement in the responses.
Further, any stigma reported was perceived by the parents as well.
Is anyone surprised that the homosexual parents reported that their
children are happier and healthier than children in
heterosexual families? 179

She goes on to note that:
The authors advertised in homosexual publications and on websites
to get participants; it was not a random sample. The study
participants knew before going into the study that its purpose was
to make homosexual parenting look successful. All of these factors
made it difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess the
study’s findings. 180

Regnerus similarly argues that it would be unwise to trust such
self-reports. 181 This is particularly true “given the high risk of ‘social
desirability bias,’ or the tendency to portray oneself (or here, one’s
children) as better than they actually are.” 182 The temptation to
report positive assessments is just unavoidable in this self-selected
sample on a sensitive and politically charged topic.
Crouse concludes on self-selection by making points that
discredit ACHESS for use in the purposes to which proponents of
same-sex marriage would wish to put it.
It is significant to note that the author admits (even though his fans
angrily attack critics who make similar observations), “The selfselection of our convenience sample has the potential to introduce
bias that could distort results.” Amazingly, Crouch also caveats his
final conclusion; he summarized, “It is clear that there are aspects
at play in our sample of same-sex families that allow improved
outcomes in general behavior, general health, and in particular
family cohesion.” Crouch admits that while “there is no evidence
to suggest that any group of parents would systematically respond

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Regnerus, supra note 168.
Id.
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in a particular way on any given scale,” such a conclusion “cannot
be discounted entirely.” He recommends that further research be
based on reports from the children, “as well as contextual analysis
of qualitative data drawn from family interviews” with a goal of
eliminating “any bias that parental reporting might have.” Crouch
concludes his study by expressing appreciation for a father in Gay
Dads of Australia for his “guidance on community engagement”
during the study. 183

The criticisms that Regnerus does make in relation to ACHESS’
sampling methods are similar to those that he makes of the United
States National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study (NLLFS). 184 In
the case of the NLLFS, Regnerus says that, again, the participants
were well aware of the political import of the study topic and that
the bias within sample is therefore impossible to discern, creating an
impossible flaw in the research. 185
Because of these major flaws, Regnerus did his own research that
avoided this major sampling problem:
Skepticism about the . . . sample is all the more reason to do a
random study that doesn’t advertise its intentions beforehand.
That’s exactly why the survey I oversaw, the New Family Structures
Study (NFSS), elected to talk to the children after they had grown
up, to skip the parents entirely to ensure a more independent
assessment, not to broadcast our key research questions in the title
or initial screener questionnaire, and to locate participants
randomly in a large population-based sample. If you’ve been paying
attention, however, you’ll know that my NFSS studies—which
mapped 248 respondents who told us their mother or father had
been in a same-sex relationship—came to rather different
conclusions than the . . . study has. 186

In turn, and in fairness, it should be noted that the LGBT
movement has produced its critics of Regnerus. 187 And, indeed, if the
ACHESS study’s conclusions are seriously to be relied upon it must
be observed that same-sex partners produce outcomes for children

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

652

Crouse, supra note 166.
Regnerus, supra note 168.
Id.
Id.
See infra text accompanying note 191.

ROCHOW.FINROCHOW.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

609

2/19/2016 4:13 PM

An Incurable Malaise

that are equal to or better than those for heterosexual couples. 188
This should not be heralded as a triumph for proponents of same-sex
marriage. Rather, if its validity is not to be doubted, the claim as a
justification for same-sex marriage would be far too modest. Instead,
it would surely mark the more desirable way to rear children. 189 But
it is not. While this is not a criticism that Regnerus makes, it follows
from the LGBT claims. 190
Among the critics of Regnerus and his methodology is Nathaniel
Frank, author of Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the
Military and Weakens America. 191 Frank is a leading advocate for gay
parenting who came into prominence for his advocacy in favor of
including openly gay recruits in the military. 192 Frank, though a
historian rather than a sociologist, has criticized Regnerus for what
he asserts is Regnerus’ flawed sociological methodology. 193 It may be
that Frank is somewhat sensitive about the methodology that he is
employing in his own research project What We Know, because the
website that displays the research simultaneously announces its bias:
The first phase focuses on research on LGBT equality, specifically
gay parenting and marriage, youth challenges, and physical and
mental health issues. Future phases may include additional policy
issues such as economic growth, gun safety, education reform and
possibly climate change, among others. The goal is to shape public
policy in a “long game” that uses research-based messages to

188. Univ. of Melbourne, AUSTL. STUDY OF CHILD HEALTH IN SAME-SEX FAMILIES,
http://www.achess.org.au/ (last visited March 10, 2015).
189. The conclusion asserts: “Australian children with same-sex attracted parents score
higher than population samples on a number of parent-reported measures of child health.
Perceived stigma is negatively associated with mental health. Through improved awareness of
stigma these findings play an important role in health policy, improving child health
outcomes.” Crouch, supra note 163.
190. Univ. of Melbourne, supra note 188.
191. NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: HOW THE GAY BAN UNDERMINES THE
MILITARY AND WEAKENS AMERICA (2009).
192. Id.
193. Nathaniel Frank, The Shamelessness of Professor Mark Regnerus, SLATE BLOG:
OUTWARD (Mar. 4, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/
03/04/mark_regnerus_testifies_in_michigan_same_sex_marriage_case_his_study_is.html.
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influence public opinion, law, and quality of life, particularly for
vulnerable populations. 194

It could hardly be suggested either that Frank is dispassionate or
that his research is undertaken without foreordained conclusions and
policy objectives in mind. And while some of Crouse’s trenchant
criticisms of the ACHESS flaws are similar to those made by
Regnerus, they are not as readily dismissed by Frank’s tit-for-tat style
response to Regnerus by pointing to his methodology rather than
answering the questions raised about ACHESS.
The second major problem with the ACHESS study is
contradictions made by its author about whether children of samesex parents encounter and are harmed by stigmas. Crouse poses
questions regarding the study’s methodology including
contradictions that are not explained in the Crouch’s work:
Ironically and in contradiction of his own research, in 2012 Crouch
was promoting same-sex parenting by quoting “longitudinal
research from the United Kingdom” that supposedly shows that
children with lesbian mothers have “social acceptance, close
friendships and peer relationships” that are “no different” from
other families; he also suggested that studies from the United
States showed that children with lesbian mothers “were more
connected at school.” The contradictions continued in his 2014
study when Crouch emphasized concerns “about the impact that
stigma and discrimination could potentially have . . . in countries
where there’s a lot of perceived stigma—most notably, the United
States.” He went on to assert, “Children face definite challenges
coping with homophobic attitudes.” (Yet, he claims, they suffer no
ill effects!) 195

Crouse goes on to note that:
Boston University Professor of Pediatrics Benjamin Siegel also
claims that the gender and “sexual orientation” of parents is
irrelevant to children’s well-being, saying that “many studies have
demonstrated” that children are much more affected by the
“relationships with their parents, their parents’ sense of

194. Cindy Gao, Call for Interns for LGBT Research Project, COLUM. L. SCH.: GENDER
&
SEXUALITY
BLOG
(Jan.
2,
2014),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/
genderandsexualitylawblog/2014/01/02/call-for-interns-for-lgbt-research-project/.
195. Crouse, supra note 166 (quoting Crouch, supra note 163)
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competence and security, and the presence of social and economic
support for the family than by the gender or the sexual orientation
of their parents.” 196

But, as Crouse observes:
Such statements raise the question: If homosexual parents in the
Crouch study perceive a lot of stigma, how can their children have
higher outcomes in some categories than children from
heterosexual families? If the parents feel an overwhelming sense of
stigma, and if they believe other people and the culture are
stigmatizing their children, how can they report such a strong
sense of security in their children? 197

Crouse then turns her attention to one of Crouch’s claims that
“[c]hildren in same-sex parent families had higher scores on
measures of general behaviour, general health and family cohesion
compared to population normative data.” 198 Further, Crouch found
no significant differences between the two groups for all other scale
scores. Physical activity, mental health, and family cohesion were all
negatively associated with increased stigma and the presence of
emotional symptoms was positively associated with increased
stigma. . . . [Same-sex couples] construct their parenting roles
more equitably than heterosexual parents. 199

Crouse notes both the contradiction for the first part of the cited
finding and the lack of evidence from Crouch or the ACHESS for
the last assertion. 200
The third and final problem with the ACHESS study is an ethical
issue. Crouse points to significant ethical concerns regarding the
manner in which ACHESS was conducted. 201 The children who are
the subject of ACHESS may have been bought. The male index
parents almost certainly engage in buying children. “In Australia,
commercial surrogacy is illegal and altruistic surrogacy is not
common; therefore, the children of male index parents (born

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Crouch, supra note 163).
Id.
Id.
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primarily in the United States and India) likely were purchased.” 202
While Crouse does not make the reference herself, this observation
will raise the hackles of some opponents of same-sex marriage
recalling the terrible Mark Newton international adoption pedophile
case in which the victim, an adopted Asian child, had been purchased
by the gay couple. 203
In short, those who favor same-sex marriage and same-sex
parenting have yet to discharge the very heavy burden to
demonstrate that there is no risk of harm to the children that will be
raised in any such relationship if it were to become law in Australia.
And certainly, it cannot be said, that they have discharged the
burden to say that same-sex relationships would be an improvement
on the current status quo. These are matters that are surely worthy
of consideration by a court such as that in Baskin. Their absence
from consideration is telling.
b. Divorce in gay longitudinal studies. One matter that seems
beyond controversy is that divorce has adverse effects upon the
former couple’s children in areas such as health, education, and
emotional wellbeing. For example, in Norway, Lyngstad and
Engelhardt conducted a study which examined the influence of
marital and divorce conduct of parents on subsequent generations, in
relation to Norwegian first marriages between 1980 and 2003. 204
The study concluded that whether a couple remained married or
divorced was repeatedly shown to be the importance to the marital
stability of their children. 205 In a yet further study, Dronkers and
Harkonen studied the intergenerational transmission of divorce
across eighteen countries and sought explanations in macro-level
characteristics for the cross-national variation. 206 They determined

202.
203.

Id.
Nick Ralston, Named: The Australian Paedophile Jailed for 40 Years, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD: NAT’L, June 30, 2013, http://m.smh.com.au/national/named-theaustralian-paedophile-jailed-for-40-years-20130630-2p5da.html.
204. Torkild Hovde Lyngstad & Henriette Engelhardt, The Influence of Offspring’s Sex
and Age at Parents’ Divorce on the Intergenerational Transmission of Divorce, Norwegian First
Marriages 1980–2003, 63 POPUL. STUD. 173, 173 (2009).
205. Id. at 179.
206. Jaap Dronkers & Juho Härkönen, The Intergenerational Transmission of Divorce in
Cross-National Perspective: Results from the Fertility and Family Surveys, 62 POPUL. STUD.
273, 273 (2008).
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that women whose parents divorced had a significantly higher risk of
divorce in seventeen countries. 207
Recently, the first lesbian couple to marry in New Zealand under
its new same-sex marriage laws are now divorcing. This example
raises the question of the statistical longevity of same-sex
marriages. 208 On this question, one would not expect that same-sex
marriage would impact significantly upon the divorce rate of 50,000
people per annum in Australia. The numbers of same-sex marriages
are most likely to be low. As will be shown in this section, the
evidence gathered from other jurisdictions is that the rate of divorce
among homosexual couples is higher than among heterosexual
couples. This has significance for children of homosexual unions.
In neither Norway nor Sweden was there any legal recognition
of same-sex “marriage” until 2009. Instead, in both countries, there
was the ability for homosexual couples to register their relationships
as civil unions. For the purposes of a recent demographical study,
however, the registered partnerships in Norway and Sweden were
treated as “same-sex marriages” to determine the rate of divorce.
Andersson, Noack, Seierstad and Weedon-Fekjaer of the Max Planck
Institute for Demographic Research conducted the study into
divorce risks when compared with the heterosexual population. 209
The study was based upon longitudinal information taken from
population registers and looked at same-sex couples in a registered
partnership. 210 The data included a wide range of demographic
integers: “age, sex, geographical background, experience of previous
opposite-sex marriage, parenthood, and educational attainment of
the parents involved.” 211 Patterns emerged in the study showing that
divorce risks are considerably higher in same-sex marriages. In the
case of female same-sex partnerships, the divorce risk was found to
be double that for male same-sex partnerships. 212

207. Id. at 285–86.
208. Simon Collins, Same-Sex Marriage Pioneers Split, N.Z. HERALD (July 17, 2014),
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11294678.
209. Gunnar Andersson et al., The Demographics of Same-Sex Marriages in Norway and
Sweden, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 79 (2006).
210. Id. at 83–86.
211. Id. at 79.
212. Id.
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The studies above (and the statistics that they disclose) do not
provide any comfort that same-sex marriages statistically provide the
most stable of environments into which to raise children. They show,
at the very least, that on an objectively conducted longitudinal study
with reliable publicly available data, that there is, statistically, at least
a genuine risk to be addressed in the interests of children. 213
Viewed another way, the evidence reinforces the case that
heterosexual marriage should be strengthened and its stability
encouraged. 214 Long pause and deep reflection are in order before
legislators and policymakers move to import what appears to be,
based on all of the international evidence, a defective product when
it comes to same-sex marriage as either an alternative or an addition
to the existing form of marriage as it is known in Australia.
VI. LGBT ACTIVISM FOR AND AGAINST MARRIAGE
Despite evidence against it, LGBT proponents have continued to
fight for same-sex marriage. They have used various tactics and
targeted specific groups on its way towards and following same-sex
marriage. First, their history shows a conflict between joining and
destroying the institution of marriage. Second, they have
appropriated words to bolster support for their cause or to label
opponents as bigots. Third, they have argued that same-sex marriage
will not change the marriage institution, but examples show
otherwise. Fourth, they have tried to force their will upon religious
and conscientious individuals. Finally, they have made it appear as if
same-sex marriage is inevitable.
A. A Brief History of the Same-Sex Marriage Movement and its
Internal Tensions
When traced back through to its sources and as will be shown
below, the pressure for legal recognition of relationships through
same-sex marriage commenced in the 1970s in the United States. In
the United States, equalities in treatment came very slowly. And so
LGBT activists’ initial strategy in America was to seek legal

213.
214.
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recognition or to destroy marriage. Klarman describes it in
these terms:
[M]ost gay activists in the early 1970s were not interested in
marriage. In 1971, one activist wrote a detailed position paper for
the ACLU in Washington State calling for the abolition of marriage
“to protect individual freedom and the happiness which depends
on it.” Lesbian feminists tended to want no part of marriage, which
they regarded as an oppressive institution, given the traditional
rules that defined it, such as coverture and immunity from rape. An
early gay manifesto denounced traditional marriage as a “rotten,
oppressive institution” that is “fraught with role playing.”
Sex radicals tended to object to traditional marriage’s insistence on
monogamy. To them, gay liberation meant sexual liberation. Much
of the early gay press urged men to overcome their sexual shame
and experiment with multiple partners. The queer politics of the
1970s embraced slogans such as “Smash the Nuclear Family” and
“Smash Monogamy.” Marriage did not comfortably fit into
that picture.
Yet some gays and lesbians plainly preferred committed,
monogamous relationships and, if obtainable, marriage. . . .
Other gay couples, seeking legal benefits of state-recognized
relationships such as inheritance rights and medical decisionmaking authority, turned to the practice of adult adoptions. 215

This pressure felt in the United States derived from legal
imperatives that did not exist at the time in Australia. Their vestiges
have long since been eroded. Now, the law in Australia places all
homosexual and heterosexual relationships on the same financial
footing both federally and in the states. 216

215.

MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH
22 (2013).
216. For examples of the rights that have accrued to married persons that are also
available to persons in a de facto relationship see: Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in
Commonwealth Laws-General Law Reform) Act 2008 and the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal
Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-Superannuation) Act 2008.; De Facto Relationships
Act 1991 (NT); De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth); Property
(Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW); Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW); Property
Law (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vic); Succession Act 1981 (Qld); Local Government Act 1995
(WA); and Maintenance Act 1967 (Tas).
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From this brief history of the 1970s LGBT movement, it can be
seen that Australia has never had much in common with the United
States when it comes to the equal treatment of homosexual
relationships for financial purposes before the law. Many of the most
recent moves at the federal level in Australia have been in apparent
recognition that although there was no need to re-define marriage,
there was a need to provide equal certainty in all other areas. 217
The following are some of the common arguments against samesex marriage that have been advanced by opponents and rejected
by supporters:
1) It will weaken the institution of traditional marriage as
a whole. 218
2) It will lead to demands for yet further reforms such as
marriage for multi-party relationships or acceptance of
underage marriage. 219
3) It will make gender roles and the position of mother and
father superfluous. 220
4) It will threaten moral and religious freedom. 221
One of the difficulties over the years of campaigning for and
against same-sex marriage has been that the arguments on both sides
have been dismissed as just speculation. 222 This is complicated by the
fact that no one seems capable of announcing any unified LGBT
goal on the subject of same-sex marriage. 223 There has been a series
of overlapping movements and those supporting same-sex marriage

217. See infra text accompanying note 238.
218. SHERIF GIRGIS, ET. AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE 54–
56 (2012).
219. Id. at 56–58.
220. Id. at 58–62.
221. Id. at 62–66.
222. Dana Milbank, Speculation’s All That’s Left for Same-Sex Marriage Foes,
(Apr.
22,
2015),
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20150422/
HERALDNET
OPINION04/150429760; Joshua Bowman, Five Arguments For Gay Marriage,
CATHOLICVOTE, http://www.catholicvote.org/five-arguments-for-gay-marriage (last visited
Nov. 2, 2015).
223. Evan Lenow, The Not-So-Unified Narrative of the LGBT Movement, COUNCIL ON
BIBLICAL MANHOOD AND WOMANHOOD
(June 4, 2015), http://cbmw.org/publicsquare/essays-perspectives-the-not-so-unified-narrative-of-the-lgbt-movement/.
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neither speak for all LGBT supporters, nor speak with any united
voice on the motives of the respective movements. 224 This has been
so since the 70s; nothing has changed. Not all homosexuals seek
same-sex marriage. Even among those that do wish to have same-sex
marriage, there is a division in their motives. 225
At a panel discussion at the Sydney Writer’s Festival in 2013,
Masha Gessen, a prominent Russian-American lesbian activist and
author, conflates inevitability with gay nihilism:
It’s a no-brainer that [homosexuals] should have the right to
marry, but I also think equally that it’s a no-brainer that the
institution of marriage should not exist. . . . Fighting for gay
marriage generally involves lying about what we are going to do
with marriage when we get there—because we lie that the
institution of marriage is not going to change, and that is a lie.
The institution of marriage is going to change, and it should
change. And again, I don’t think it should exist. And I don’t like
taking part in creating fictions about my life. That’s sort of not
what I had in mind when I came out thirty years ago.
I have three kids who have five parents, more or less, and I don’t
see why they shouldn’t have five parents legally . . . I met my new
partner, and she had just had a baby, and that baby’s biological
father is my brother, and my daughter’s biological father is a man
who lives in Russia, and my adopted son also considers him his
father. So the five parents break down into two groups of three . . .
and really, I would like to live in a legal system that is capable of
reflecting that reality, and I don’t think that’s compatible with the
institution of marriage. 226

The division exists among lesbian feminists as to whether
marriage is indeed a proper goal as opposed to the destruction of
marriage itself. Some of the second-wave feminist writers such as

224. Natalie Neusch, Gays Who Don’t Want Gay Marriage, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 26,
2011, 3:51 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/02/26/gays-who-dontwant-gay-marriage.html.
225. Lenow, supra note 223.
226. Life Matters, Why Get Married When You Could be Happy?, RN (June 11, 2012),
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lifematters/why-get-married/4058506. As
to current moves to have polyamory recognized as a legal basis for marriage in New Zealand,
see Auckland Ratepayers Paying to Push Polyamory, FAMILY FIRST NEW ZEALAND (June 5,
2014), www.familyfirst.org.nz/2014/06/auckland-ratepayers-paying-to-push-polyamory.
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Betty Friedan, author of the Feminine Mystique in 1963, supported a
227
nihilist view: marriage should be destroyed as an institution.
Feminists like de Beauvoir and Friedan regarded marriage as an
228
oppressive regime.
In Friedan’s view marriage was “a male
(patriarchal) artifice designed by men to force women to serve them
and to have sex with them.” 229
Feminist opposition to the institution of marriage per se has been
adopted as part of the argument against same-sex marriage. As an
example, Polikoff has attacked lesbian promotion of same-sex
marriage because, according to her, feminists “believed [marriage] to
be an oppressive, patriarchal institution.” 230
According to three United States scholars, who have researched
and written extensively on legal and policy questions relating to
marriage generally and same-sex marriage specifically, there are two
views of marriage:
The conjugal view of marriage has long informed the law—along
with the literature, art, philosophy, religion and social practice—of
our civilization. . . . It is a vision of marriage as a bodily as well as
an emotional and spiritual bond, distinguished thus by its
comprehensiveness, which is, like all love, effusive: flowing out into
the wide sharing of family life and ahead to lifelong fidelity. In
marriage, so understood, the world rests its hope and finds
ultimate renewal.
A second, revisionist view has informed the marriage policy reforms
of the last several decades. It is a vision of marriage as, in essence, a
loving emotional bond, one distinguished by its intensity—a bond
that needn’t point beyond the partners, in which fidelity is
ultimately subject to one’s own desires. In marriage, so
understood, partners seek emotional fulfillment, and remain as
long as they find it. 231

227. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
228. Id.
229. AUGUSTO ZIMMERMAN, WESTERN LEGAL THEORY: HISTORY, CONCEPTS AND
PERSPECTIVES 235 (2012).
230. Id. at 239 (quoting Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in
Every Marriage”, 72 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993)).
231. GIRGIS ET AL., supra note 218, at 1–2.
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As already shown, the evidence gathered from other jurisdictions
shows that there is no longer a need to speculate in respect to the
effect upon children, the divorce rate, and the impact upon existing
marriages. 232 On the question of the impact upon children, there is
enough evidence in the studies referred to above to demonstrate that
conjugal marriage is to be preferred, indeed, even privileged as a
policy option. 233 A stable marriage between biological parents is, on
the preponderance of the evidence, the best environment in which to
raise children. Any new institution of marriage should, for these
purposes, be considered experimental at best and, in reality, secondrate and potentially disastrous. This desire to change or destroy
marriage has led the LGBT community to various tactics including
appropriation of certain words.
B. Appropriation of Language, Ad Hominem Attacks,
and Malapropisms
What has also been evident for some time is that the LGBT
movement has a tendency to appropriate ordinary words to its cause
and to create new terms of opprobrium for those who oppose its
objectives. In the early days of the movement, the noun and verb
“camp” was appropriated by the movement as a self-reference and an
acronym of the description of the movement as the “Campaign
against Moral Persecution.” 234 In more recent times the word “gay”
has been rendered so that it can no longer sensibly be used in any
other context than to describe a male homosexual.
And as for the insults invented by the movement, which seem to
have passed unchecked by linguists into common usage, it is hard to
imagine a more ill-suited set of words than “homophobia,”
“homophobe,” and “homophobic.” These malapropisms are either
ridiculous or are dishonestly devised to divert the argument from
logic and evidence to personal attack. Instead of describing a fear or
its sufferer, these concocted words can only refer, legitimately, to the
fact of disagreement. They are weasel words calculated to demean

232. See supra Part IV.
233. See supra Part IV.
234. Campaign against Moral Persecution: 30th Anniversary of Decriminalization of
Homosexuality
in
NSW,
ALASTAIRLAWRIE
BLOG
(June
7,
2014),
http://alastairlawrie.net/tag/campaign-against-moral-persecution/.
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rather than address the argument and the evidence. They are used as
insulting epithets for all those who oppose, reasonably or otherwise,
the objectives of the movement. Disagreement with any of the
LGBT causes célèbres will evoke their use.
C. Changes to the Current Institution of Marriage in the Event of
Same-Sex Marriage Becoming Legal
Next, the proponents of same-sex marriage claim that its
introduction will have no impact upon the institution of marriage.
The Court in Baskin accepted this claim, but experience appears to
put it to the lie in regards to the core definitions and terms of
marriage. At the very least, there is need to re-define and re-word
terms that have commonly been associated with heterosexual
marriage: mother; father; parent; husband; wife; spouse.
The court must have been aware that as of January 1, 2015 the
law in California was to change pursuant to the provisions of Senate
Bill 1306, which redefines marriage in that state as a “personal
relation arising out of a civil contract between 2 persons . . . .” 235 In
that state, as of January 2015 there is no longer a “husband” or a
“wife” but only “spouses.” 236 This initiative of the current Governor
of California is a far cry from the initiative in 2008, when fifty-two
percent of California’s citizens voted to protect marriage and its
definition as being between one man and one woman. 237
This reform has been hailed by gay rights activists. For example,
the National Center for Lesbian Rights Executive Director Kate
Kendell says of the reform:
Although there is no question that same-sex couples can marry in
California, the discriminatory language that remains on the
statutory books creates confusion about the rights of same-sex
couples. This law makes it clear to everyone that same-sex couples
can marry and that all spouses have the exact same rights and
responsibilities under the law, regardless of gender. 238

235. S.B. 1306, 2013–14 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
236. Id.
237. See Dennis Romero, You May Now Kiss the “Spouse” Under a New Californian Law,
LA WEEKLY (July 8, 2014), http://www.laweekly.com/informer/2014/07/08/you-maynow-kiss-the-spouse-under-a-new-california-law.
238. See Id.
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The pro-traditional marriage group National Organization for
Marriage has had a different response. It says that the new law was
“further proof that redefining marriage is not simply about
‘equality’. . . it is about fundamentally altering the meaning of the
institution itself.” 239
In the United Kingdom a similar move was implemented by the
Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 where Parliament approved
proposals to remove the terms “husband,” “wife,” and “widow”
from legislation dating back hundreds of years. 240 Parliament voted in
favor of proposals to prevent a man who marries a King of Britain
from being referred to as a “Queen” and to stop the same-sex
partner of a future Prince of Wales from being referred to as the
“Princess of Wales.” 241 Among the amendments that were passed was
one to the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869, which allowed
cab licenses of deceased “husbands” to be transferred to their
“widows” by way of a London Cab Order. The statutory language in
the Act was changed to ensure no vestigial offence might be caused
to LGBT cab owners. 242 Somehow, though, its wording had survived
the feminist movement and the offence that the gender specific
terms might cause to female cabbies. Christian Concern, an
organization with similar objectives in marriage preservation to those
of the United States National Organization for Marriage, reacted
through its spokeswoman, Andrea Williams, predictably as follows:
This is the land of make-believe and we are operating in the realms
of the absurd.
Proposed amendments in areas ranging from cab licences [sic] to
royal titles show what a mess the Government has created. We are
twisting language to fit a collective deception that undermines the
truth about what marriage is. 243

239. Terms “Husband” and “Wife” Removed from California’s Marriage Law,
(July
15,
2014),
http://www.christianconcern.com/ourCHRISTIAN CONCERN
concerns/same-sex-marriage/
terms-husband-and-wife-removed-from-californiasmarriage-law.
240. The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (Consequential and Contrary
Provisions and Scotland), c. 30 (Eng. & Wales) [hereinafter The Marriage Act of 2013].
241. Id. art. 3, sch. 2, pt. 1, para 1.
242. Id. art. 2, sch. 1 para. 1(a)(i).
243. CHRISTIAN CONCERN, supra note 239.
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D. Of “Butchers, Bakers and Candlestick Makers”: Loss of
Freedoms of Conscience, Political Expression and Religion
Another more insidious effect is that there are, consequent upon
legalization of same-sex marriage and the promotion of LGBT social
claims, negative impacts upon freedoms of speech, association,
conscience and religion. The freedom to express views and to act
upon them is being curtailed in jurisdictions where same-sex
marriage has either become part of the law or where there are strong
movements for it to become such. 244 It now seems that strongly held
views in favor of conjugal marriage are not only being discouraged
by law and policy but, in a number of cases, “offenders” are being
prosecuted for their positions at the public expense. 245
The resignation of Mozilla Firefox co-founder, Brendan Eich, as
the CEO of that company drew attention to how much scrutiny
society gives to people’s political activities in the never-ending search
for political correctness. 246 It has now become offensive in many
western cultures for a person to hold a different point of view than
that agitated by the LGBT lobby. 247 A specter of political correctness
was evident recently when Chase Bank administered a questionnaire
to their employees in which they were asked to disclose whether they
had disabilities, had a child with disabilities, had a spouse or
domestic partner with disabilities, were lesbian, gay, bisexual or
transgender in their self-description, or were allies of the LGBT
movement. 248 The agenda was less than subtle. 249

244. Kevin Jones, LGBT Grant-Maker Wants to Win Religious Liberty Fight Within Three
Years, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (July 29, 2015, 12:31 AM), www.catholicnewsagency.com/
news/lgbt-grant-maker-wants-to-win-religious-liberty-fight-within-three-years-96064/.
245. Vincent Funaro, Christian Court Clerk Fired for Refusing to Process Paperwork for
Gay Marriages Sues Indiana County for Religious Discrimination, THE CHRISTIAN POST (July
27, 2015), www.christianpost.com/news/christian-court-clerk-fired-for-refusing-to-processpaper work-for-gay-marriages-sues-indiana-county-for-religious-discrimination-141860; see also
Matthew Chandler, Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible Avenues for Accommodation
of Civil Servants Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1625.
246. David Crary, Rachel Zoll & Michael Liedtke, Mozilla CEO Resignation Raises
Free-Speech Issues, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2014), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/04/04/mozilla-ceo-resignation-free-speech/7328759/.
247. Id.
248. Brian S. Brown, Boycott Chase Bank, NAT’L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE BLOG (July 16,
2014), http://www.nomblog.com/39511/.
249. Id.
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Despite the fact that in the LGBT and feminist literature there
are differing reasons as to why one might oppose same-sex marriage,
it appears that it is those who oppose it upon conscientious or
religious reasons who have been particularly targeted. The following
cases are some examples.
In Craig and Mullins v. Masterpiece Cake Shop Inc. & Anor, 250
the State of Colorado Administrative Court found that a cake-maker,
who, on grounds of a religious conscientious objection to same-sex
marriage, declined to bake a cake celebrating such a wedding, was
held to have acted unlawfully.
On May 30, 2014, on appeal, the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission upheld the decision of the Administrative Court and
ordered, among other things, that the cake-maker cease
discriminating, cause staff to have comprehensive training in antidiscrimination legislation and report to the commission quarterly for
two years as to compliance, which reports were to document the
number of patrons refused service and the reasons for such refusal. 251
What is of interest in this case is that at the time of refusal same-sex
marriage was not legal in Colorado. The marriage to be celebrated
had been contracted in another state where same-sex marriage was
legal. 252 It is not clear what the result might have been had the cakemaker been a strident feminist who objected to any form of marriage
but particularly was interested in making political statements against
same-sex marriage and refused on those grounds. That case is now
under further appeal.
In Washington State, a florist who felt unable to supply flowers
for a same-sex couple’s wedding because of her strongly held
religious convictions, is currently the subject of a lawsuit. 253
In the State of New Mexico, wedding photographers, whose
religious beliefs prevented them from photographing a same-sex

250. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cake Shop, CR2013-008 (Colo. Admin. Ct. Dec. 6, 2013).
251. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cake Shop, CR2013-008 (Colo. Civ. Rights Comm. May
30, 2014).
252. Id.
253. Elaine Porterfield, Washington State Florist Sued Again for Refusal to Service Gay
Wedding, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/19/us-usagaymarriage-washington-id USBRE93I08820130419.
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wedding, have been found by the New Mexico Supreme Court to be
in breach of the New Mexico Human Rights Act. 254
A case that has not yet resulted in a prosecution, but has gained
notoriety, concerns the demands of a gay rights activist who ordered
a cake from a Christian-run bakery in Northern Ireland that carried a
picture of the Sesame Street characters Bert and Ernie with the
slogan “support gay marriage.” 255 The proprietors “insisted that
producing the cake with the slogan and a picture of the puppets arm
in arm printed onto the icing would amount to endorsing the
campaign for the introduction of gay marriage in the province,”
where it is currently illegal, “and go against their religious
convictions.” 256 The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland has
now written to the bakers, insisting that they are in breach of the
law. It claims that refusing to decorate the cake amounted to
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation against the man who
placed the order. 257
The last-mentioned case underlines the absurdity that has arisen
from these restrictions upon what can be said or done about
marriage. Apart from the fact that same-sex marriage is currently
illegal in Northern Ireland, the order for the cake carried a
requirement for the bakers to assist in making a political statement
with
which
they,
as
a
matter
of
conscience,
258
fundamentally disagreed.
Further, there seems no basis for appropriating Bert and Ernie as
symbols of same-sex marriage. Bert and Ernie are puppets. They
have no sexual feelings, inclinations to marriage, or desire to make
political statements on the subject. This was made clear by Sesame
Street Muppets™ on its Facebook page in 2011, but seems to have
gone unnoticed in the pursuit of the bakery:

254. Elaine Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
255. Bert and Ernie ‘Gay Wedding Cake’: Christian-Run Bakery Faces Legal Action over
(U.K.)
(July
9,
2014),
Refusal
to
Supply
Cake,
INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/northern-ireland-bakery-refuses-tomake-gay-bert-and-ernie-wedding-cake-9590745.html.
256. Id.
257. Id. The above are merely some examples of many. For discussion of recent events in
Canada, see Lain T. Benson, Law Deans, Legal Coercion and the Freedoms of Association and
671
(2013),
available
at
Religion
in
Canada,
71
ADVOCATE
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2328945.
258. INDEPENDENT, supra note 255.
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Bert and Ernie are best friends. They were created to teach
preschoolers that people can be good friends with those who are
very different from themselves.
Even though they are identified as male characters and possess
many human traits and characteristics (as most Sesame
Street Muppets™ do), they remain puppets, and do not have a
sexual orientation. 259

Finally, there is nothing in the news to date that indicates that
the person who ordered the cake had any license from Sesame Street
to reproduce Bert and Ernie’s images on a cake to make a political
statement. Without such a license, the cake makers would infringe
upon those rights and render themselves amenable to action for such
infringement. And, with such a weak case, the bakery is being
pursued at the State’s expense.
In making these observations regarding the United States and
other jurisdictions, certainly Australia is not immune from this form
of state-sponsored persecution of those who are not politically
correct about LGBTs. Just what the position would be if same-sex
marriage were to become legal, one can only speculate. But how it
might be for ordinary business operators was clearly illustrated in the
recent Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal decision in
Christian Youth Camps Limited & Rowe v. Cobaw Community
Health Services Limited & Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human
Rights Commission & The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria,
discussed by Associate Professor Foster in his case note concerning
the decision. 260
In Christian Youth Camps, the majority decided the camp was
liable for discriminatory conduct because it did not allow a gay youth
group to book one of the camps. 261 This result has been criticized in
the press 262 as well as by my colleague, Associate Professor Foster. 263
259. Sesame Workshop Statement on Bert and Ernie Petitions, SESAME WORKSHOP (Aug.
11, 2011 10:00 AM), available at https://www.facebook.com/note.php?created&&note_id=
10150290119497855&id=1375 9741267.
260. See Neil Foster, Christian Youth Camp Liable for Declining Booking From
Homosexual Support Group, FREEDOM 4 FAITH, http://www.freedom4faith.org.au/resources
/Reading/Christian%20Youth%20Camp_Neil%20Foster%20Summary.pdf (last visited Feb.
27, 2015).
261. Christian Youth Camps Limited & Rowe v. Cobaw Community Health Services
Ltd., [2014] VSCA 75 (Austl.).
262. Foster & Towers, supra note 2.
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The misreading of authority and international law that is the subject
of criticism will soon be the subject of argument in the High Court,
as an application for special leave is pending. The majority based its
reasons upon a number of platforms.
Among them is one that is captured in the following dictum:
The appeal submission for Cobaw was that the purported
distinction—between sexual orientation of those attending the
camp and what would be said to them about their sexual
orientation—was misconceived. Reliance was placed on the
following statement in her Honour’s reasons:
“Sexual orientation, like gender, race and ethnicity, [is] part of
a person’s being, or identity. The essence of the prohibitions
on discrimination on the basis of attributes such as sexual
orientation, gender, race or ethnicity is to recognise the right
of people to be who and what they are. . . . To distinguish
between an aspect of a person’s identity, and conduct which
accepts that aspect of identity, or encourages people to see that
part of identity as normal, or part of the natural and healthy
range of human identities, is to deny the right to enjoyment
and acceptance of identity.”
As the amicus submission of the ICJ pointed out, the proposition
that sexual orientation is an important aspect of a person’s identity
has been affirmed in other jurisdictions. 264

The dictum cited from the Court of first instance was accepted as
being open on the evidence by the majority.
In contrast, Redlich JA, in the minority, adopted an approach
that seems more acceptable, in terms of logic and a reality that
tolerates a diversity of opinions to be expressed in the public square.
It is one that I respectfully suggest would have commended itself to
the Court in Baskin.
His Honour observed as follows:

263. Neil Foster, Christian Youth Camp Liable for Declining Booking from Homosexual
Youth Group, available at http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/78 (last visited Nov. 4,
2015); ACL Team, Associate Professor Neil Foster Talks About the Christian Youth Camps Case,
AUSTL. CHRISTIAN LOBBY (May 27, 2014, 4:14 AM), http://www.acl.org.au/2014/
05/associate-professor-neil-foster-talks-about-the-christian-youth-camps-case/.
264. Christian Youth Camps v. Cobaw (2014) VSCA 75, ¶ 57 (citations omitted).
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The precepts and standards which a religious adherent accepts as
binding in order to give effect to his or her beliefs are as much part
of their religion as the belief itself. The obligation of a person to
give effect to religious principles in everyday life is derived from the
overarching personal responsibility to act in obedience to the
Divine’s will as it is reflected in those principles. Religious faith is a
fundamental right because our society tolerates pluralism and
diversity and because of the value of religion to a person whose
faith is a central tenet of their identity. The person must, within the
limits prescribed by the exemptions, be free to give effect to
that faith. 265

Having described a person’s religious belief to be a central part
of their identity, it follows that all persons of any persuasion, be it
moral, political or religious, must be free to express those views
within the marketplace within certain reasonable but not stifling
limits. Certainly, no person should be required to act contrary to
their conscience. Redlich JA provides an illustration:
For example, assume that the applicants had been informed that
the purpose of the proposed forum was to gather together for the
purpose of discussing the contentions that the Divine does not
exist and that Christ does not say, and of how the community
might be made aware of those views. Once the applicants became
appraised of that purpose, I do not doubt that it would have been
necessary for them to refuse the use of their facility for such
purposes. That their beliefs necessitated such a course flows from
the findings made by the Tribunal under [section] 75(2) as to the
content of the Christian Brethren’s beliefs and principles. The same
must hold true for other religious beliefs or principles which the
adherence of their faith genuinely believe reflected the wills of the
Divine and commanded obedience. 266

The above illustrations demonstrate what would be lost, based
on experiences in other jurisdictions as well as in Australia, if such a
reform were to become law. The cost is, on the face of it, just too
great to existing liberties of conscience and religion. Yet, again, these
considerations were absent in Baskin.

265.
266.

Id. ¶ 560.
Id. ¶ 571.
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E. Inevitability?
Finally, the opening paragraph of Baskin accepts without
question the argument that same-sex marriage is inevitable. 267 This is
the argument that seems to have currency as a sort of defeatist
justification when no other logical or evidence-based argument
will suffice.
Certainly, any sense of inevitability does not hold true in
Australia. Only one jurisdiction, the ACT, has ever passed same-sex
marriage legislation into law, despite numerous attempts in the
federal Parliament and various states, and that case, as we have seen,
was struck down by the High Court. 268
Recently, the European Court of Human Rights handed down
its decision in Hämäläinen v. Finland, in which petitioners sought a
declaration that the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) Articles 8 and 12 gave a right for citizens to require of
members states legislation that permitted same-sex marriage. 269 The
court made it clear that there was no right to same-sex marriage
under either Article 8 or 12 of the ECHR:
71. The Court reiterates its case-law according to which Article 8
of the Convention cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation
on Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage.
....
96. The Court reiterates that Article 12 of the Convention is a lex
specialis for the right to marry. It secures the fundamental right of a
man and woman to marry and to found a family. Article 12
expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law. It
enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as being between a
man and a woman. While it is true that some Contracting States
have extended marriage to same-sex partners, Article 12 cannot be

267. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2014).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 22–56.
269. Hämäläinen v. Finland, App. No. 37359/09, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 259, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%2237359/09%2
2],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22ite
mid%22:[%22001-145768%22]}.
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construed as imposing an obligation on the Contracting States to
grant access to marriage to same-sex couples. 270

The Court also dismissed an alleged “European standards and
consensus” that would prevent states from defining marriage as the
union between one man and one woman:
73. From the information available to the Court . . . it appears that
currently ten member States allow same-sex marriage [: Belgium,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (England and
Wales only)]). . . .
74. Thus, it cannot be said that there exists any European
consensus on allowing same-sex marriages. 271

It seems far better to judge matters as they actually are. In
Europe, there is a diversity of positions in relation to same-sex
marriage. 272 Some permit same-sex partnership registration. 273
Among the most recent to introduce same-sex marriage are England
and Wales. 274 Of all European nations, including the twenty-eight
EU countries, only eleven permit same-sex marriages, 275 while others
permit some form of union with limited legal recognition. 276 Ten of
the thirteen most recent member states to join the EU have rejected
the proposal for same-sex marriage. 277 Australia may be considered
the last redoubt among Anglophone nations, but it is by no means
alone in the West or indeed in the world. 278
270. Id. §§ 71, 96 (citing Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 2010 Eur.
Ct. H.R. § 101; Rees v. The United Kingdom, Ser. A no. 106, Oct. 171986, §§ 43-44).
271. Id. §§ 73–74.
272. Michael Lipka, Eastern and Western Europe Divided Over Gay Marriage,
Homosexuality,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(December
12,
2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/12/eastern-and-western-europe-dividedover-gay-marriage-homosexuality/.
273. Gay Marriage Around the World, BBC NEWS WORLD (April 23, 2013),
http://www.bbc. com/news/world-21321731.
274. The Marriage Act of 2013, c. 30 (Eng. & Wales).
275. Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark,
France, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom (England and Wales).
276. BBC NEWS WORLD, supra note 273.
277. Michael W. Chapman, 10 of 13 Newest EU States Reject ‘Gay Marriage’,
CNSNEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/michaelw-chapman/10-13-newest-eu-states-reject-gay-marriage.
278. BBC News World, supra note 273. See postscript regarding Ireland.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In July of 2014, a Sydney judge compared society’s opprobrium
for pedophilia and incest to the position it took on homosexual
relations only a few decades ago. 279 He advocated that incest should
no longer be a criminal offence given that the progeny of
consanguineous sexual relations can be prevented either through
contraception or abortion. 280 More recently, a German government
ethics committee came to the conclusion that not only is there
nothing morally wrong with sexual relations between siblings; those
relations are a right. 281 While these liberal agitations were taking
place, immigration officers in Sydney detained a fourteen-year-old
girl because they suspected that she was travelling to Lebanon for an
arranged marriage with a much older man. 282 And Elton John
recently assured us that Jesus would have approved of same-sex
marriage. 283 Added to these, we have the two cases that are the
subject of this paper.
Critic Rosemary Neill commented recently that the fascination
with dystopias found in the baby-boomer generation is continuing
into the next generation of book and film consumers. 284 None of the
incidents referred to in the preceding paragraph would seem out of
place in any novel or film in the genre. Yet, just a generation ago,
none of these headline incidents would have been thought possible;
they would only have appeared in fiction.
Whether it be in 1984, 285 Animal Farm, 286 Brave New World, 287
The Handmaid’s Tale, 288 Never Let Me Go, 289 or Fahrenheit 451, 290 the

279. Hall, supra note 59.
280. Hall, supra note 59.
281. Huggler, supra note 59.
282. Brennan, supra note 59.
283. Dermot Murnaghan, Sir Elton Says Jesus Would Back Gay Marriage, SKY NEWS
(June 29, 2014), http://news.sky.com/story/1291479/sir-elton-says-jesus-would-backgay-marriage.
284. Rosemary Neill, Teen Dystopias Like the Hunger Games and the Giver Take Over
Hollywood, THE AUSTL. (Sep. 13, 2014), available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au
/arts/review/teen-dystopias-like-the-hunger-games-and-the-giver-take-over-hollywood/storyfn9n8gph-1227055348774.
285. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950).
286. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1945).
287. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
288. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1986).
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themes seem recurrent: an enslaving, all-pervading, totalitarian
regime having sprung from some unidentified historical source of
dissatisfaction, some distant past apocalypse, technology having gone
mad, or from inaction in enforcing moral codes; loss of the value of
the individual; re-definition or abolition of the family; ruthless
suppression of any opposition. There are many variations of these
themes and they seem to hold our fascination and that of the rising
generation with young adult novels and films churning out similar
subliminal warnings. But there is, with only a few exceptions, one
yawning gap in all of the dystopias depicted: there is complete silence
about God, conscience, and religion.
We live in a world where there are two currents pulling in
different directions. There are the fundamentalist extremists who see
the ideal society as theocratic: one in which everyone is subservient
to God as they imagine Him. 291 Then there is the other direction, in
which we are pulled by the West, by secular extremists, in the name
of “equality,” where there is freedom from religion rather than
freedom of religion, where God is completely banished from the
public square, and where freedom of religion and conscience end at
the temple door. 292 These two directions are antithetical. One
compels absorption in a conception of God to the exclusion of all
care for our fellow humans; the other is absorbed with the rights of
humans to the exclusion of God.
As critical as I am of both of the reasoning of the High Court in
ACT and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Baskin, the
question must be asked at a metaphysical level whether they are
merely social barometers: symptomatic of a deeper malaise in public
intellectual activity in the academy, the press, the legislature,
executive arms of government, and, now, in the courts. There is a
consciousness of this malaise in the writing of Habermas, in which he
proposes some adaptation of Judeo-Christian ethics re-written in

289. KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME GO (2006).
290. RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953).
291. Kevin Craig, Theocracy!, CRAIG FOR CONG., http://kevincraig.us/theocracy.htm
(last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
292. About FFRF, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., http://ffrf.org/about (last
visited Nov. 4, 2015).
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secular code. 293 But the cure for this malaise has been the subject of
vain searches by post-modern ethicists and philosophers. Western
public thought seems set upon a path of banishing, in so far as it is
possible, all religion and mention of God from the public square. If
Nietzsche was premature in declaring God dead, 294 there are now
many who seem intent upon burying Him—dead or alive.
It seems that all public institutions are intent, to one degree or
another, upon testing the Dostoyeskian notion that if God does not
exist, then everything is permissible. As secularism takes firmer hold
of the public psyche, we are confronted with a public Nietzschean
amorality, evident in the reasons of Judge Posner in Baskin. 295 Some
alternative form of theocratic fundamentalist dictatorship needs only
to be mentioned to be rejected. If we are to have a dystopian reality
in the West, it seems it will be one of our own making.
But, the Nietzschean outcome seems most likely unless the West
was to embrace afresh the Lockean model of a conscience and
equality before the law, informed by Christian belief, as advocated by
Jeremy Waldron. 296 While the return to Lockean ideals remains an
unlikely possibility, the most likely result will be more of the fudging
on legal principles evident in ACT. And as poor as the unrestrained
rant passing as judicial reasoning from Judge Posner in Baskin may
be, one can expect more of this form of economic rationalism rather
than a serious and even-handed grappling with these issues.
If there is no balance possible between the divine and the
profane, is the West so committed to secularism that it can see no
other way? It would seem from the incidents referred to, the legalism
of the High Court and the economic rationalism of the Seventh
Circuit, that there may be more than coincidence. We may, in fact, as

293. Jürgen Habermas, Modernity: An Unfinished Project, in HABERMAS AND THE
UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 38, 38–55 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves & Seyla Benhabib eds.,
1997); JÜRGEN HABERMAS THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY
3–49 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998).
294. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE (THE JOYFUL WISDOM) 120 (Bernard
Williams ed., Josefine Nauckoff trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1882).
295. KENAN MALIK, THE QUEST FOR A MORAL COMPASS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF
ETHICS, at v–vi (2014).
296. JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 82 (2002).
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POSTSCRIPT
Since the writing of this article, the Supreme Court of United
States has handed down its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. 297 There
were many surprising elements to be found in the reasoning of the
majority, not the least that two judges who had previously shown a
disposition to favor same-sex marriage before hearing the case chose
not to recuse themselves. 298 Had they done so, it seems the result
would have been entirely the opposite.
While these are matters for the comment of others, there is one
other surprising element that contrasts with the Australian
experience. The decision of the Supreme Court seems to display a
relaxed, if not cavalier, attitude to vaulting the divide between the
legislative arm of government and the judicial arm under the
separation of powers doctrine.
Unlike the Australian High Court, which handed the question of
same-sex marriage back to the federal Parliament, the majority in the
Supreme Court refused, by process of a number of constitutional
interpretations, to acknowledge the democratic decisions reached by
electors in a number of states and arrogated the decision to themselves
as a majority of five to four, with two of the Justices having refused, as
noted before in this postscript, to recuse themselves. 299
But, the decision of the Supreme Court could be interpreted as
one more fall of the dominoes in the direction of same sex-marriage
297. 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015).
298. Justices Ginsburg and Kagan had shown what would seem to have been partiality
prior to the hearing. Both Justices had reportedly performed same-sex marriages. Michael
Gryboski, Should Two Supreme Court Justices Who Officiated Gay Weddings Recuse Themselves
from Same-Sex Marriage Case?, CP POL. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.christianpost.com/
news/should-two-supreme-court-justices-who-officiated-gay-weddings-recuse-themselvesfrom-same-sex-marriage-case-135049/; Liz Goodwin, As Arguments Near, Justice Ginsburg
Has Already Made Up Her Mind on Gay Marriage, YAHOO! POL. (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://www.yahoo.com/politics/as-arguments-near-justice-ginsburg-hasalready117280631046.html. It therefore would seem that position of both Justices arguably
fell under the mandatory recusal provision in title 28, part I, chapter 21, section 455 of the
U.S. Code: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
299. See 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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in Australia. In fact, there have been three other events that have
occurred since this article was first written that may be regarded as
watershed moments for those that support the introduction of samesex marriage. First came the Irish referendum where the result was in
favor of same-sex marriage. 300Next came the change of Australian
Prime Minister from one who was firmly opposed to same-sex
marriage to one who strongly supports it. 301And then, finally, a
Senate select committee report was handed down recommending
that there be a parliamentary vote rather than a popular vote on
the question. 302
And yet while the same-sex marriage debate has, of course,
continued to rage in Australia, the position does not seem to have
changed. And it now seems that the contrast could not be starker
between the American and the Australian experiences. What is still
proposed by the current federal government is that there be either a
constitutional referendum or a national plebiscite on the issue of
same-sex marriage. 303 By this mechanism, the government seeks, it
says, to hand the question of a radical change to the age old social
institution of marriage back to the people.
So, by a democratic political process rather than a legal one,
Australia seems destined, under the current government, to test
whether there is any cure for what seems in some Western nations to
be as one of its symptoms of the malaise: the dictation by a small
elite as to what is acceptable for the majority.

300. Results Received at the Central Count Centre for the Referendum on the ThirtyFourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Bill 2015, REFERENDUM IR.,
http://referendum.ie/results.php?ref=10 (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
301. George Williams, Under PM Turnbull, Where to Now for Same-Sex Marriage?, THE
AGE (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.theage.com.au/comment/under-pm-turnbull-where-tonow-for-samesex-marriage-20150919-gjqmiu.html.
302. Matter of a Popular Vote, in the Form of a Plebiscite or Referendum, on the Matter of
Marriage in Australia, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Marriage_
Plebiscite/Report.
303. Coalition Nails Colours to Traditional Marriage, THE AUSTL. (August 12, 2015),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/coalition-nails-colours-to-traditionalmarriage/story-fn59niix-1227479570397.
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